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PREFACE
On January 20, 1949, President Truman in his inaugural ad-
dress laid the foundation for what was to he known as Point Pour.
This plan was to make available to peace-loving peoples the ben-
efits of the United States store of technical knowledge and to
foster capital investments in the areas needing development.
The purpose of this study is to present to the reader the
conflicting attitudes and the various interpretations in regard
to the Point Pour program. Idealists sat/ in the concept an op-
portunity without parallel to extend to all who want them, the
standard of living and the way of life that had made the United
States envied among nations. Skeptics suspected we were being
tricked into dissipating our resources in a task we could never
expect to complete, leaving the United States prey to a cynical
enemy who hopefully awaited our economic ruin. Between these two
extremes students of the idea saw an opportunity to foster stable
governments and contented nations while building up markets for
our own exports and sources of the raw materials we need.
Technical assistance is a revolutionary idea and a gigantic
undertaking. The last section presents to the reader a general
survey of what has happened since the Act for International De-
velopment was passed on June 5, 1950.
The principle sources of information were the Congressional
Record
,
the State Department Bulletins and Publications , the
Foreign Policy Association Reports and Bulletins
, the New York
Tines
,
the Brookings Studies Group Publications
, and various
iv
periodicals including Newsweek , Time , and the Annals of American
Academy of Political and Social Science .
The writer wishes to acknowledge the service and the as-
sistance given to her by A. Bower Sageser, Professor of History,
and graduate adviser.
INTRODUCTION
President Truman's call for "a bold, new program" to pro-
mote "the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas" — the
much-discussed Point Pour in his Inaugural Address of January 20,
1949 — gave timely emphasis to what had hitherto been a rela-
tively minor aspect of the foreign economic policy of the United
States. The Point Pour program was America's response to the as-
pirations of the nations embodying two-thirds of the world's pop-
ulation, for economic development as a means of achieving a better
life. It had been said recently that the term "economic develop-
ment" had become the shibboleth of our time.-'- It had become,
since the war, the byword of the peoples of the underdeveloped
areas of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle and Far East. It
had been closely associated with nationalism and the desire for
independence on the part of the colonial areas or countries whose
internal economic affairs had been largely dominated by foreign
economic interests. It had also been associated with the growing
unrest on the part of hundreds of millions of people who, after
countless generations of unquestioning acceptance of their tra-
ditional manner of living, had suddenly yearned for and demanded
a social and economic revolution. This new social ferment was in
part the consequence of the contacts of many millions of people
with representatives of the industrial nations of the world. The
Raymond F. Mikesell, United States Economic Policy and
International Relations, p. 223.
sight of a jeep or an Army truck passing long lines of Chinese
coolies climbing hills with sacks on their backs, the American
bulldozers doing the work of hundreds of natives working with
crude picks, the luxuries available to the lowest-ranking Amer-
ican soldiers at the PX, made a lasting impression on millions
of Chinese, Indians, and Egyptians.
The awakening aspirations of the peoples of the underde-
veloped areas had been echoed by their leaders at home and abroad
and had been frequently used as an argument for greater economic
and political independence on the grounds that foreign domination
was a barrier to the realization of economic development. These
aspirations had been repeated time and time again in councils of
the United Nations and other international bodies. The Commu-
nists had been quick to capitalize upon this desire of the under-
privileged masses for a better life. They had declared with con-
siderable justification that the pashas, the rajas, the foreign
companies, and the reactionary politicans were barriers to a more
abundant life for the masses and that the way to begin was to
destroy the existing social and political fabric. The Communists
had pointed with success to Russia's five-year plans in indus-
trializing the Soviet Union without the help of Western capital.
They had an alarming degree of success among people who had noth-
ing to lose but their chains, even though it meant simply ex-
changing old chains for new ones.
The Point Pour program represented an effort to meet the
aspirations of the underdeveloped peoples, and at the same time
an effort to meet the challenge of the Communists. In a recent
address, Secretary of State Acheson said:
The Communists talk of organizing great masses of
people in five-year plans to carry out elaborate eco-
nomic programs. They say this is the way for people to
get more of the necessities of life. They promise hun-
gry, distressed people food and material comforts if
only they will accept slavery to the state in return.
And to people who have always been miserable, who have
never known the protection of a Bill of Rights, these
spurious promises sound real.
The alternative that is offered these people
through the President's idea is a way to improve their
material welfare and at the same time live as free men,
retain their personal dignity and independence, and de-
velop to the full extent of their individual capacities.
They are offered a way of life that leads not only to
freedom from want but also the most priceless freedom —
the right to be let alone.
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The concept of Point Pour was boldly conceived, but it had
not as yet been as boldly planned. It was not new. Government
officials, business men, and economists had long been familiar
with the need for extending industrialization to the nonindus-
trialized areas of the world. They had, moreover, shown under-
standing of some of the more general problems involved in such a
policy. The great merit of the Point Pour approach, in the words
of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, was that "it established
(the) economic development of the underdeveloped areas for the
first time as a national policy."'-'
During the Second World War, the economic resources of lead-
ing European creditor nations were considerably reduced, with the
result that the United States was now the only large potential
2 Mikesell, op. cit
.
, pp. 224-225.
3
"A Task For Generations," Strengthening the Forces of Free -
dom
, (Department of State Publication), 1950, pT~68'.
4exporter of capital and technology. Under these circumstances,
the initiative in promoting world economic development rested
mainly with this country. Point Pour recognized the fact that,
for some time to come, United States foreign policy must give
greater weight to problems of economic and social advance abroad.
As a member of the United Nations and its affiliated agencies,
this country shared a common obligation to contribute to world
economic, social, and cultural progress.
With the end of the Second World War, the President felt
compelled to proclaim on August 21, 1945, that lend-lease would
cease immediately. Although the economic costs of war did not
cease at the moment of victory, the Congress had been repeatedly
assured that lend-lease would not continue into the postwar peri-
od. This sudden termination imposed a great strain on European
countries, particularly on Great Britain. Special credits to
finance supplies that were in the lend-lease "pipeline"'* were
granted to some countries to ease the strain of transition. For
others, the strain was eased by the American contribution to
UNRRA, which rose from $589,000,000 in 1945 to $1,589,000,000
in 1946, and by the distribution of civilian supplies by the Amer-
ican armed forces.
5
* Kikesell, od. clt
. ,
p. 93. Lend-lease supplies and ser-
vices under contract of agricultural commodities' under alloca-
tion, under agreements with the recipient countries to pay for
them either immediately upon delivery or on time.
The International Studies Group of the Brookings Institu-
tion, Major Problems of U. S . Foreign Policy - 1951-1952, Sep-
tember, 1951, p. 11"2.
5The first and. most important over-all settlement of lend-
lease and reciprocal aid was made with Britain on December 6,
1945. This Anglo-American Financial Agreement provided for more
than a loan and the settlement of the lend-lease and surplus prop-
erty accounts. It obligated Great Britain to begin the dissolu-
tion of the sterling area by abandoning the application of quo-
tas, and to make sterling convertible for current transactions.
In addition, Great Britain gave its full approval to the main
points of a document, largely American-drafted, entitled "Pro-
posals for the Expansion of World Trade and Employment." These
proposals, which were designed by the United States to give ef-
fect to the commercial policy objectives of Article VII of the
Master Lend-Lease Agreements with Britain and a number of other
countries, became the basis for the Charter of the International
Trade Organization. Lend-lease agreements were also made with
France, India, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, and Turkey in
1946.
While the United States, in cooperation with other coun-
tries, was thus developing support for its long-term economic
objectives, the true nature and extent of the economic disloca-
tions of the war were only gradually being recognized. At the
end of the Second World War, the American policy was largely con-
cerned with converting the policies, agreements, and interna-
tional institutions that the wartime coalition had developed in-
to a course of common action that would seek to establish a
world order of peace and security and growing well-being. Within
the year following the war, however, it had to be assumed that
6the Soviet Union did not mean to honor the agreements into which
it had entered, but was on the contrary exploiting for its own
national ends the arrangements that had been adopted for taking
common action. American policy began to be adjusted to this new
reading of the international situation, and courses of action
were rapidly initiated and multiplied to meet the threat that
was implicit in it.
The winter of 1946-1947 xvas extraordinarily severe in Europe
and many European countries began to experience serious diffi-
culties with recovery programs. Great britain was compelled to
reduce its foreign political commitments and to announce in Feb-
ruary, 1947, the cessation of its assistance to Greece. In
March, 1947, President Truman called to the attention of the
Congress the precarious condition of Greece, and in the course
of his message said:
I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting at-
tempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures.
I believe we must assist free peoples to work out
their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through
economic and financial aid which is essential to eco-
nomic stability and orderly political processes.
6
This proposal became known as the Truman Doctrine, and led
to the enactment in May, 1947, of the Act to Provide Assistance
to Greece and Turkey . The type of action taken also came to be
6
"Aid to Greece and Turkey, " Department of State Bulletin
,
Supplement
,
May 4, 1947, p. 1.
7identified as a policy of "containment," and was regarded as a
means of checking the aggressive features of Soviet-Communist
policy. Political considerations began to infringe upon econom-
ic policy, and by the middle of 1947 it was clear that a re-
appraisal of foreign needs for American aid was necessary.
In June, Secretary Marshall proposed a new basis for future
assistance, of which the keynote was European cooperation in
joint recovery effort. The Marshall Plan was the logical out-
come of the Truman Doctrine for the supporting of the economies
of friendly countries so that they could maintain their political
independence and their democratic institutions.
Proposals for a long-range recovery program were presented
to the Congress by President Truman in December, 1947, and after
extensive debate the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 was passed
in April. The objectives of the act were both political and
economic. They were to restore and maintain "principles of in-
dividual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence,"
which, it was recognized, depended "largely upon the establish-
ment of sound economic conditions, stable international relation-
ships, and the achievement by the countries of Europe of a
healthy economy independent of extraordinary outside assistance."
It was the judgment of the Congress that concerted European ef-
forts were necessary to achieve these objectives. Each parti-
cipating country, in addition to adhering to a multilateral con-
vention to guarantee the jointness of the recovery effort, was
required to conclude undertakings to increase domestic produc-
tion, to restore monetary stability, and to cooperate in reduc-
8ing trade barriers. The agreements also contained pledges to
make effective use of all resources, to help the United States
in its stockpiling program, and to establish local currency ac-
counts equivalent to the aid received as grants. These "counter-
part" funds were to he used only for purposes approved by the
United States. The participating countries signed a Convention
for European Economic Cooperation containing the required multi-
lateral pledges, and established the Organization for European
Cooperation (OEEC) to carry them out.
Simultaneously, the general international trade objectives
of the United States were furthered by the signing of the Charter
of the International Trade Organization (ITO) at Havana by the
representatives of fifty-three countries. The major principles
and objectives of the ITO Charter, which reflected the general
international economic policies of the United States, were writ-
ten into the principal documents governing the European Recovery
Program.
The inauguration of the European Recovery Program marked a
new attempt to rehabilitate the world economic system. A four-
year attack was planned on the economic ills of Europe, both be-
cause of the desperate situation existing there and because of
the importance of this industrial region to the world as a whole.
It was hoped that, as the problems of Europe were solved, the
flow of European goods and capital to other countries would go
far to restore the rest of the world-trading system.
By the middle of 1950, it appeared that many of the European
Recovery Program's goals were going to be realized perhaps, in
some oases, well ahead of mid-1952. By June, 1950, industrial
production in the ERP countries had reached 128 per cent of pre-
war, and exports to the rest of the world were 28 per cent above
1938. Western Europe's over-all current-account deficit had de-
clined from $7,400,000,000 in 1947 to less than $3,000,000,000
in the period 1949-1950. By 1949-1950 the gold and dollar def-
icit on current account had also been reduced to well under
three billion dollars. Since ERP countries had received four
billion dollars in American aid during 1949-1950, they were able
to increase their gold and dollar reserves by $2,100,000,000 be-
tween September, 1949, and September, 1950, of which about two-
thirds was accounted for by the United Kingdom. Merchandise im-
ports of the ERP countries from the United States declined from
$5,700,000,000 in 1947 to about $3,400,000,000 in 1950. There
was, however, only a modest increase in merchandise exports to
the United States from $843,000,000 in 1947 to $1,300,000,000
in 1950. 7
These over-all figures concealed many important differences
in the positions of individual ERP countries. While in the sec-
ond quarter of 1950 industrial production in Sweden was 169 per
cent of prewar and in Britain 149 per cent, production in West-
ern Germany was less than prewar and in Italy and Greece 109 per
cent and 119 per cent of 1938, respectively. Similar differ-
ences existed in the recovery of exports in the second quarter of
1950, with Britain leading with exports at 165 per cent of the
7 Mikesell, op. cit., pp. 277-278.
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1938 volume, and France, 160 per cent; while Western Germany,
78 per cent and Italy, 99 per cent were exporting less than pre-
war. It should be said in the case of Germany that the 1950
levels of production and exports represented a remarkable im-
provement over the levels of 1947 when they were only 34 and
8 per cent, respectively, of the 1938 volume. 8
Except in the case of a few countries, e.g., Austria and
Greece, most ERP countries were rapidly expanding their pro-
ductive capacities to the point where they would not require ad-
ditional net resources to maintain living standards at political-
ly tolerable levels. There were, of course, some factors which
remained in doubt. Viability required not only the ability to
produce, but the ability to find markets and to earn sufficient
dollars or dollar-convertible currencies with which to pay for
essential imports from the dollar area. Whether or not most SRP
countries would need additional United States assistance after
1952 appeared to depend upon:
(1) Their ability to convert surpluses with non-
dollar countries into dollars, (2) their ability to
switch from dollar to nondollar sources of supply,
(3) their ability to expand exports to the dollar area,
and (4) the degree of deterioration in their terms of
trade .
9
Since V-E Day, the implementation of our foreign economic
policy had been largely in the field of reconstruction rather
than development. Because of their important role in the world
8 Mlkesell, loc. cit.
9 Op. cit., p. 280.
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economy, the industrial nations of Western Europe had enjoyed
priority in the allocation of grants, credits, and supplies.
Restoration of the productive capacity of these countries had
been considered an essential preliminary to any over-all plan for
overseas development. Although well aware of the logic of first
restoring the export capacity of Western Europe, spokesmen for
the underdeveloped areas had nevertheless become increasingly
critical of Washington, D. C.'s world recovery program. There
had been a growing impatience to translate into action the prom-
ise of internation cooperation to promote social and economic de-
velopment.
Postwar activities of American private industry abroad con-
sisted of assisting development of primary producers by long-
term licensing agreements which included the export of technol-
ogy. In the past many companies had established branch plants
in other countries, but recently there had been several instances
in which a foreign business contracted to import our machinery
and know-how. The Westinghouse Electric International Corpora-
tion had signed a number of such agreements since 1945. One of
these was with a Brazilian manufacturing company — Electromar —
and provided that engineering assistance should be given in the
design and construction of plants to produce certain electrical
products under Westinghouse patents. As compensation, the Amer-
ican concern was to receive stipulated fees.
Many more examples might be cited of the export of techni-
cal knowledge to develop the industry of other countries. Since
1945, a large number of plants had been designed,, built, equipped
12
and put into operation for foreign interests by United States
firms. These projects Included units to produce steel, chemical
products, textiles, cement, and so forth. Again, many contracts
had been signed for the construction of highways, irrigation
projects, power plants, and port facilities. The demand for Amer-
ican engineering and management advice had, in fact, grown to
such proportions in the postwar period that several new busi-
nesses specializing in foreign contracts had been organized. As
an example, the American Industrial Development Engineering Com-
pany might be cited. It had constructed or was constructing
plants in India, China, British East Africa, Union of South Af-
rica, French Morocco, South America, and elsewhere. Its ser-
vices included not only design and building, but also arrange-
ments to expedite the shipment of machinery from this country.
Other firms doing a similar business overseas included the P. H.
McG-raw Company, J. G. White Engineering Company, W. W. Kellogg
Company, Morrison-Khudsen Company, and so forth. Not infrequent-
ly, the government of an underdeveloped country seeking to map
out a sound long-range program for social and economic progress
had contracted with one or more of the above-mentioned companies
to carry out a comprehensive survey and recommended specific de-
velopmental projects.
In many underdeveloped countries, particularly during and
since the war, the acute shortage of foodstuffs had prompted the
United States to place much emphasis on agriculture in its for-
eign aid program. Moreover, adequate planning to meet the food,
health, and educational needs of a country was a precondition for
13
sustained industrial development. But improvement in standards
of living also required a carefully considered increase in in-
dustrial facilities. Accordingly, long-range foreign assistance
nust give due attention to the industrial potential of the par-
ticular country. This approach had not been neglected in the
United States foreign economic policy, although hitherto only a
few technical missions had undertaken comprehensive surveys.
The experience gained, however, was sufficient to 3erve as a sat-
isfactory guide in future cooperative planning of economic de-
velopment.
In his inaugural address of January, 1949, President Truman
proposed to make cooperative economic development a major na-
tional policy and a major enterprise of the American people and
their government. However, the President proposed more than
economic development. He called for "a cooperative enterprise
in which all nations work together through the United Nations
and its specialized agencies." President Truman believed we
should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of
our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize
their aspirations for a better life. Here he was proposing a
program to help the governments of underdeveloped areas do those
things which would make the areas attractive for large-scale cap-
ital investment from private sources. He recognized that this
kind of aid was vital to the development of backward areas and
had value far out of proportion to the money involved in helping
underdeveloped countries to help themselves. The most striking
feature of the underdeveloped areas was the low standards of liv-
14
ing compared to advanced countries. More than half the people
in the world were living in conditions approaching misery. Dis-
ease, malnutrition, high mortality rates, illiteracy, social dis-
organization, and civil unrest were all associated with low pro-
ductivity. Widespread and chronic poverty tended to engender un-
rest. Their poverty was not only a handicap and a threat to
them, but also to the more prosperous areas. According to Pres-
ident Truman:
Greater production is the key to prosperity and
peace. And the key to greater production is wider and
more vigorous application of modern scientific and tech-
nical knowledge . 10
Thus President Truman presented to Congress the first vague
outline of what had been called "one of the most enlightened ideas
of the first half of the century." The fourth point of hi3 in-
augural address was to become a new departure in American foreign
policy.
"The Faith of the American People," A New Era in World
Affairs
,
(Department of State Publication), T9497 pT~8~
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POINT FOUR DURING THE FIRST SESSION
OF THE 81ST CONGRESS
On January 20, 1949, speaking from the east front of the
capitol in Washington, Harry Truman delivered his first inaugural
address. The fourth point, or Point Four as it soon came to he
called, was in general well-received by the Congressmen grouped
behind the President on the Capitol steps. Partisanship was
largely absent, * but questions were soon raised by the members
of both parties, for the President's address had sketched only
the merest outline of his proposal. Congressmen immediately in-
quired what would be its scope and its cost. There was particu-
lar interest in the sentence which implied that there should be
guarantees for private investments abroad.
Among the Senators, particularly those from the South, there
was an initial wariness both of the proposal to share industrial
techniques and to encourage foreign investment, but this was
viewed more as the normal senatorial reaction than as an indica-
tion of a coalesced opposition to the program. 2 Senator O'Mahon-
ey (D-Wyo.) soon indicated his loyalty to the administration with
the statement that "this is a proclamation by the President of
economic freedom, to be coupled with the political freedom al-
ready supposed to have been won. This plan will preserve the
system of private property if we handle it in harmony with the
New York Time
s
,
January 21, 1949, p. 1, column 4.
p
Loc. cit.
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President's concept."3 Senator Taft's (R-Ohio) first comment
was that he saw "nothing particularly revolutionary about it."4
Senator Harry Byrd (D-Va.), Chairman of the Joint Committee on
Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures, hinted that
President Truman's program would meet with his disapproval, for
he viewed it as "neither wise nor practical. 1 ' 5 Senator Homer
Capehart (R-Ind.) failed to perceive the difference between Point
Four and previous economic measures. In his opinion, "The plan
sounds a lot like my proposed substitute for the Marshall Plan
that was to promote international trade and commerce by develop-
ing private trade instead of socialism or communism." It seemed
that a good many Congressmen probably overlooked, at first, the
essential distinction between aid for the economic recovery of
industrial nations devastated by the war, and aid for the eco-
nomic development of nations which had never been industrialized
and had neither the education nor hygenic standards of the Mar-
shall Plan countries.
Senator Wherry (R-Neb.) echoed a \videspread sentiment when
he said, "(Truman's) proposals are on such a colossal financial
scale that deficit spending would be inevitable and would threat-
en, if not destroy, our national solvency."^
3 New York Times
,
January 21, 1949, 1:4.
Loc . cit .
Loc . cit .
Loc . cit .
7 Loc. cit.
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By no means were all Republicans opposed to Point Pour, for
Representative Jacob K. Javits (R-N. Y. ) approved of the program
on the day of its announcement, and later lent strong support to
its principles throughout its progress in Congress. He viewed
Point Pour as "....one of the most fruitful concepts for future
development of the world and for resisting communistic influ-
ences." 8
By the following day Senator Taft's thoughts on Point Pour
had crystallized in opposition to the proposal for government
guaranteed private foreign investments. It was chiefly in op-
position to the guarantees that dissent in the Senate came to a
focus. Senator Taft saw great danger, domestically, in huge-
scale guarantees of investments abroad, and reflected a consider-
able body of senatorial opinion when he expressed the danger in
an overestimation of the force American guarantees could have in
raising living standards in under-developed areas. He saw an
even greater hazard in "over-promising" areas against Communis-
tic advances. 9 Senator Taft recalled that the House's Post-War
Economic Policy Committee had recommended Government guarantees
of foreign investments in 1945, up to the maximum of two billion
dollars. The International Bank, Taft said, had as one of its
authorizations the guaranteeing of investments abroad, but in-
stead had raised money through issues of its own debentures. His
New York Times
,
January 21, 1949, 1:4.
9 New York Times
, January 22, 1949, 1:4.
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reasons for distrusting any system of guarantees were many and
varied:
I doubt the wisdom of wide- scale guarantees to pri-
vate investment abroad. There is uncertainty as to the
way Governments operate, particularly socialistic Govern-
ments. Such operations may lead to imperialism, and
there we would* be left holding the bag.... I would almost
rather put up a half-billion dollars in grants yearly,
as a part of the Marshall Plan, for these projects, and
forget them, rather than to try and collect them.
Then, as though remembering his father' s painful experiences
in certain Latin-American countries, he went on to say:
We are not popular as a collector, and we are no
good at being an imperialist. At the same time, we are
not strong enough to undertake this program, except un-
der limited expense. .. .If the objective is to raise liv-
ing standards in these underdeveloped areas to those of
the United States, what we could do by guaranteed in-
vestment would be only a drop in the bucket to what these
areas would have to do for themselves. 10
On the same day, Senator Vandenberg (R-Hich.) asserted that
he wished to "underscore" the President' s admonition that Ameri-
can resources had their limits, 11 a sentiment repeated the fol-
lowing day by Senator Lucas, 12 ari^ suggested that international
plans be perfected before new ones were begun. 13
While a number of the Republican leaders expressed their dis-
approval, Democratic leaders expressed confidence that Congress
would enact any legislation proposed by the Administration neces-
sary to implement the new program for economic development of
backward areas. However, they sought further enlightenment be-
Hew York Times
,
January 22, 1949, 1:4.
11 Loc . cit.
12 Ibid
., January 23, 1949, 30:3.
13
"World Pair Deal," Newsweek
, January 31, 1949, 33:18.
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fore putting the legislative machinery to work on it.
Although he had no idea what manner of bill the Administra-
tion might put forward, Speaker Rayburn (D-Tex.) did not hesi-
tate to say that "....if we can pass lend-lease and United Na-
tions, we can certainly do this. "I4 He gave the plan his uncon-
ditional endorsement as "very generous, statesmanlike, and the
thing to do if we are going to be this big \vorld power we have
got to be. "15 Rayburn saw an opportunity for the investment of
private capital, but had no information on what the Administra-
tion might be contemplating to encourage such action or guarantee
the investment. However, he did not visualize any "world-wide
RFC." 16
Foreign reaction to the Point Four portion of the inaugu-
ral address was quite varied. A dispatch from Tass, official
Russian News agency, denounced the whole speech as an "enraged
attack" on communism, and described Point Four as a 'plan to se-
cure the "maximum possibilities for penetration by American cap-
ital into backward nations. "I7
The Inter-American Economic and Social Council (representa-
tives of the 21 American Republics) viewed this new and bold pol-
icy as one that "fully meets with the objectives which the coun-
cil has been seeking and which were examined at Rio de Janeiro
14 New York Times , January 23, 1949, 30:3.
Loc . cit.
16 Loc. cit .
17 Ibid ., January 23, 1949, 30:5.
20
H 1 ft
and Bogota Conferences....
England's Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who was the first
major statesman in Europe to embrace the Marshall Plan, led the
way again in welcoming President Truman's program. Bevin spoke
for all powers responsible for overseas territories in saying,
"that we welcome President Truman's statement, that we shall join
with them, that we will throw into the pool all knowledge, abil-
ity, and resources that we have at our command. "•"' He believed
that a good standard of life and happiness in association with
Western civilization was probably the greatest contribution that
they could make.
The statement of Italy's Foreign Minister, Count Carlo
Sforza, in which he pledged support to a "twentieth century mis-
sion" to promote greater progress in Africa, inferred support
for Truman's program. 20 Later, he referred to the program as a
"cornerstone on which peace can be built.
"
21 The former French
Premier, Paul Reynaud, said he v/as "struck by the note of altru-
ism." 22
There was- actually little in the President's outline of the
Point Four program that was new to the American scene. For years
technical aid and capital investment in economically backward
18 Hew York Times , January 23, 1949, 33:5.
19 Ibid ., January 26, 1949, 1:5.
20 Ibid., January 28, 1949, 17:7.
21
"World Fair Deal," Newsweek , January 31, 1949, 33:18.
Loc. cit.
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countries had been a part of American commercial activities over-
seas. Now, these practices were to be greatly enlarged and con-
sciously incorporated into American foreign policy. Harold E.
Stassen, a leader in the Republican party, urged that the Ameri-
can program of aid to foreign nations be extended to include
"export" of the basic concept of freedom. The concept of the
freedom of man as expressed by Franklin, was "the very basis on
which the technical know-how and the cultural advance of our peo-
ple' has been built." 23
Several days later, W. Averell Harriman, special representa-
tive to the Marshall Plan, said after talking with President Tru-
man that the President's proposal "fits in" with plans of the
Western European countries for development of their dependent
areas, and that the President's suggestion for world development
would "give impetus" to this work. 24
Both European and American economic experts believed the
President had pointed the way to a world answer to Communism for
which the Marshall Plan had been groping. In the opinion of the
economic experts, to save Europe, all the brains and administra-
tive ability available must be mobilized to prevent President
Truman's idea of a world program of economic development of back-
ward areas from being smothered in ill-informed enthusiasm. ^
On January 27, President Truman announced that he had di-
23 New York Times , January 23, 1949, 17:3.
24 Ibid ., January 26, 1949, 19:4.
25 Ibid ., January 28, 1949, 12:4.
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rected Secretary of State, Dean G. Achescn, to call the Federal
Department Chiefs together to begin preliminary planning of his
"bold new program" for improving the underdeveloped areas of the
world. The chief executive frankly acknowledged that he did not
know the specific details, the when or the how of his plan. He
did say, with all the stress that he could put in his voice, that
he knew what he wanted to do. He linked the plan to his effort
to achieve world peace. The plan came into his mind, Truman ex-
plained to his weekly news conference, when he proclaimed the
Truman Doctrine of containing totalitarism and when he offered
the Greek-Turkish aid program in March, 1947. 26 The plan would
now be the administrative policy for the next four years and
would materialize gradually.
According to The Mew Republic , the President's inspiration
came from a group of Mew Dealers in his administration, notably
from two men in the Department of Interior: Oscar Chapman, at
that time the assistant secretary, and Arthur Goldschmidt, spe-
cial assistant to the secretary. This periodical hailed the pro-
gram as a tremendous step in the right direction. "The plan for
aid to the backward nations of the world is a proposal magnifi-
cent in purpose and breathtaking in scope, the sort of thing
Franklin Roosevelt would have loved and to which he certainly
would have turned eventually had not the clouds of war inter-
vened." 27 In Ernest K. Lindley's article in Newsweek, he said
26 New York Times
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that Wendell Willkie would have applauded President Truman's
fourth point, for he had preached the same theme in his chapter
on the Middle East in One World . Lindley further stated that the
program was a carefully formulated statement of major policy:
the long-range answer of the free world to the ambitions and pre-
tensions of Communism in Asia and other economically backward
areas of the globe. 28
About two and one-half months later, Newsweek contained an
article entitled, "Whose Bold New Program?" The author said that
he did not know who sold the ideas to Truman, but that at least
the record showed clearly where the idea came from in the first
place. It came out of a book, Teheran : Our Path in War and
Peace , by Earl Browder, who was at that time head of the Commun-
ist Party in the United States. To back up his statement, he
gave several excerpts from the book, one of ivhich was the fol-
lov/ing:
Our government can create a series of giant in-
dustrial development corporations, each in partnership
with some other government or group of governments, and
set them to work upon large-scale plans of railroad and
highway building, agriculture, and industrial develop-
ment, and all-around modernization in all the devastated
and underdeveloped areas of the \7Orld....0n a world
scale the combined projects could be self-liquidating
in the period of a generation. They \vould become the
best investments the American capitalist class had ever
made in its whole history. 29
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On February 28, Charles Sawyer, the Secretary of Commerce,
urged American businessmen to cooperate in following President
Truman's suggestion that we launch a "bold, new program" of as-
sistance to other countries. Addressing the Chicago world trade
conference, Sawyer said, "The time has come to intensify our co-
operation with other nations to enable them to participate more
fully in the technological achievements of our age."30 Accord-
ing to Sawyer, the main barrier to a prosperous world trade was
fear and insecurity among nations, and, to eliminate this barrier,
he suggested three types of assistance:
One of the most effective ways to restore confidence
and build a healthy world trade is to help build stronger
basic economies where they are weak. American business
can do much through private investment to strengthen the
economies of other nations.
A second type of assistance American businesses can
lend to other nations is the direct training of foreign
nationals in the management and operation of American in-
stallations abroad. This practice is good business be-
cause a country that learns to use American equipment
wants more American equipment.
The third type of assistance involves the applica-
tion of American techniques in foreign countries to
achieve low cost production and efficient distribution
of basic necessities. 31
Representatives to the United Nations Economic and Social
Council expressed varied opinions on Point Four. Dr. Katz-Suchy,
the Polish representative, denounced the plan as primarily an-
other attempt to provide private investors with new opportunities
New York Times , March 1, 1949, 37:1.
31 Loc. cit.
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for profits,32 William Borberg, Denmark's delegate, described
the program as a "very, very good thing for the United Nations"
in special praise for the insistence that as much of the work be
channeled through the world organization as possible. 33
Without the benefit of guidance from the Administration,
Congressmen were forming their own opinions as best they could.
Perhaps the lack of concrete recommendations from the White House
accounted for the fact that congressional views of Point Pour did
not at once become polarized in the familiar patterns of party
doctrine. Another reason was found in the nature of Point Pour
itself. It became evident that two distinct acts of Congress
mould be necessary to make it a reality: one bill to authorize
and define abroad policy of technical assistance, and another to
establish a system of guarantees. The heart of Point Pour lay,
of course, in the provision of technical aid. Pew Congressmen
disputed the virtues of this aspect of the program, their approv-
al being encouraged by the likelihood that its cost to the gov-
ernment would be relatively small. Also, there was little in an
offer of technical knowledge to identify the program with "a
quart of milk for every Hottentot" or lead to a belief that it
would be the "final projection of New Deal statism."34
It was the second part of the President's venture, the pro-
posal to guarantee investments, which led from the outset to the
32 New York Times
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greatest dissension among Congressmen of both parties. The Pres-
ident had indicated in his address that these investments were to
be made by private individuals. Consequently, the basic prob-
lems were (a) how to induce American capital to enter underde-
veloped areas; (b) how to make it reasonably safe after it got
there; and (c) how to avoid the seemingly inevitable charges of
imperialism. A related problem was that of which agency should
furnish the guarantees the President had asked for.
The first person to offer an answer to these questions was
Representative Christian A. Herter, a Republican from Massachu-
setts. Basing his suggestions on a report prepared by the School
of International Studies, Herter called for the negotiation of
bilateral treaties specifically designed to protect American in-
terests. He recommended that the treaties offer assurance that
investments would not be discriminated against; that prior pay-
ment would be made in the currency of the investing country in
the event of expropriation or nationalization; that a flow of ex-
change would be maintained for the remittance of profits; and
that the nations affected would accept the principle that invest-
ments were entitled to a fair return. In addition, such treaties
would provide for the investors to employ and place in the de-
velopment projects adequate personnel of their own choosing, and
that such investors \vould be freed from restraints involving ar-
bitrary acceptance of local capital or local directors, as some
countries require. The primary purpose of these treaties was to
create a suitable climate for and to safeguard the American in-
vestments without recourse to guarantees. Without such treaties,
27
Herter said the program might turn into one of "false hope. &
Like many Republicans, Herter believed that the program
should be dissociated as much as possible from the Federal Gov-
ernment.
If consideration of Point Four gives false hope
to the world that the United States is embarking on a
great international Vi'PA program, then it will lead to
disappointment and failure. If, on the other hand,
Point Four is implemented in a sound way, it can be
of the utmost importance both from the economic and
social viewpoint. 36
In thus advocating the separateness of investment from government,
Herter formulated a policy which played a major role in the com-
mittee hearing to follow.
In the eleven weeks following the President's proposal, of-
ficial thinking had apparently shifted away from the ideas that
the dominant element in the plan would be broader technical as-
sistance to the backward areas; that is, more teams of health,
geological, and agricultural experts. Now technical assistance
and private investment were considered of "parallel importance"
in all plans. The real long-range burden was ultimately to be
borne by private capital, because the greatest potential expan-
sion lay in the flow of private American capital to these areas.
To stimulate and create a "favorable climate" for private
investment, three groups of guarantees would probably be sought
from the countries concerned. Group one would include guaran-
tees of convertibility of local currency into dollars; guaran-
35 New York Times , April 8, 1949, 4:3.
36 Loc. cit.
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tees against expropriation without adequate and effective com-
pensation; and guarantees against discriminatory laws. Group two
would consist of treaties to be negotiated by the State Department
for the establishment of a code of fair investment behavior,
which would treat foreign investors fairly on the understanding
that the investors would not engage in old-fashioned dollar-im-
perialism. Group three would guarantee tax inducements of var-
ious kinds, including lower tax rates.
About this time one government official asked rhetorically,
"What is in all this for us?" Then he went on to say, "A world
so settled that there is enough social progress in it so that
people won't find the economic appeal of communism attractive."
His final comment was that, if the people of the world realized
that their future lay beside us rather than against us, the cost
of this program would be a small price to pay. 37
Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce, continued urging Amer-
ican businessmen to make the investments necessary to carry out
the ideals of the President's program. He said that some ele-
ments in business favored government guarantees while others op-
posed them. However, business must be insured a profit on its
investments, since business could not exist without a profit,
and companies must be assured of convertibility of their profits
as well as their original investments. Also, the free consent
and cooperation of the foreign nations must be secured. We must
not try to force our money and techniques on those countries,
37 New York Times
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and we must not seek any extra-territorial privileges or prefer-
ential treatment beyond what rights we give reciprocally in the
country. In recognition of strong nationalistic feelings we must
give ample assurance that the inflow of American capital would
not be accompanied by interference with national policies or by
American domination of their economies. 3®
On April 30, the United Nations reported that hostility
torard private foreign investors on the part of governments in
many underdeveloped countries was giving way to increasing eager-
ness to attract their capital into ambitious projects conceived
under the "bold, new program." Mindful of an increasing economy
and the already heavy commitments of the United States in West-
ern Europe, the delegates from Latin-American and Asiatic coun-
tries were ready to concede that what large-scale financial as-
sistance they received would have to come from individuals and
corporations in this country and not from the State Department. 39
Although underdeveloped countries were becoming surprisingly
ready to lower bars to American investors and foreign capital-
ists generally, there were naturally great differences among
countries and regions as to what constitutes a liberal foreign
investment policy. Strong and growing countries like Chile and
Uruguay had little to fear from an inflow of American capital.
Peru boasted that it maintained no restrictions or regulations
to hamper the American investor and was perfectly attuned to the
3S New York Times
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rays of private enterprise. The same confidence in their abil-
ider.t axor.g Indonesian and Indian leaders; and the most dis-
trustful of the private capitalists were the states of the Mid-
dle .East. Egypt and Iraq, while in desperate straits for Amer-
ican assistance, were more inclined to go through TJnited Nations
channels than solicit aid dir^ctl*^ from " tihsr'.in--rtr**i ;^nd ?*s^v
York.-O
Truman's proposal had been universally interpreted to in-
clude colonies and other non-self-supporting territories. For
this reason, British colonial experts, and to a lesser extent
French and Belgian authorities, had eagerly awaited clarifica-
tion of the whole plan as it might affect them. The British
looked upon the program of economic development carried out un-
der United Nation's auspices as the least desirable alternative
for implementing the President's plan. They pointed to the de-
lay, red tape, and the obstructionism that any such program would
encounter in the United Nations. 41 The British made vigorous ef-
forts to convince American businessmen that sinking funds in co-
lonial projects could be profitable.
On May 16, it was announced that two pieces of legislation
for a technical assistance program were being drafted in the De-
partment of State. The first of these would authorize the Pres-
ident or Secretary of State to administer the program; contract
40 New York Times , May 1, 1949, 111-1:1.
41 Loc. clt.
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for the services of individuals, corporations, and government
agencies; and suggest tasks to be carried out by the United Na-
tions. The second piece of legislation concerned appropriations,
and of a total proposed cost of $105,000,000 for the first year,
the major part was to come from the participating nations and
only 30 million dollars from the United States. Two days later,
Secretary Acheson reported progress on the technical aid measure,
but said that legislation to promote international investment
was still in the early stage of discussion.'*-'
These proposals comprised the first of a series of draft
measures which were fed to Congress piecemeal until the session
ended in October. At no time was a completed plan for Point Pour
presented to Congress. Rather, Congress was offered the pieces
and asked to fit them together into a workable mechanism. An-
ticipating the introduction of draft bills via the State Depart-
ment, a group of 46 Representatives sponsored by Jacob K. Javits
(R-N. Y. ) and Abraham J. Multer (D-N. Y. ) joined in presenting a
resolution to create a special commission to study the possible
development of Near Eastern countries by the United States alone
or in conjunction with the United Nations. Senators Paul Doug-
las (D-Ill.) and Raymond Baldwin (D-Conn.) said they would intro-
duce a similar resolution in the Senate. 43
The President took the next step in a speech he delivered
at Little Rock on June 12, 1949. He linked Point Pour with our
42 New York Times , May 19, 1949, 12:1.
43 Loc. cit.
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fight to "knock out the social and political evils on which com-
munism thrives," and said he would soon send to Congress the
recommendations then being developed by the State Department. A
few days later, Assistant Secretary of State Ernest Gross elab-
orated the Administration' s plans when he said that the explora-
tory projects which President Truman had mentioned in his speech
would not be financed out of federal funds, but that the Federal
Government would assist other governments in finding technicians
and financial aid from private sources. The cost of the part to
be played by the Government was estimated at 48 million dollars.
He asserted that the United States would not guarantee private
investors against loss, but would encourage them by providing
assurances (treaties?) against confiscation, and guaranteeing
the convertibility of their original investments into dollar s. 45
It thus appeared that the Department of State had incorporated a
part of Representative Herter's recommendations into its draft.
The Hew York Times predicted that the Senate would give the Ad-
ministration' s proposals a cool reception, pointing to Senator
Vandenburg's reluctance to add 48 million dollars to the budget
or increase the already heavy load of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. 46
Thus far in June, Congress had been offered very little sub-
stantial material on which to base a program of Point Four legis-
44 Hew York Times
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lation. On June 25, however, the President sent to Congress a
message well-provided with food for thought. The President asked
Congress to appropriate 45 million dollars for technical assist-
ance, revising upward by 15 million dollars the State Depart-
ment's original estimate. He adopted in part the Herter proposal
by announcing his intention to negotiate treaties to protect the
American investor from "unwarranted risks" in other countries.
But he advanced beyond the scope of Representative Herter' s sug-
gestion in asking that the Export-Import Bank be authorized to
give guarantee investments against devaluation, expropriation,
or destruction by war or rebellion. American capital was to be
encouraged to expand overseas by a combination of the Herter sys-
tem of bilateral treaties and what amounted to the federal in-
surance of foreign investments. President Truman qualified the
scope of these guarantees, however, by adding that "we do not, of
course, ask privileges for American capital greater than those
granted to other investors in underdeveloped areas, or greater
than we ourselves grant in this country."*" In urging that Cong-
ress adopt his recommendations, the President pointed out that
both the United States and Europe needed the raw materials and
the new markets which would arise from Point Pour; further, that
the improvement of underdeveloped areas would help to remove the
economic causes of war and thereby strengthen the United Nations.
Nor did he neglect to remind Congress that these areas might turn
47 The text of the President's message is reproduced in the
Hew York Times , June 25, 1949, 6:2.
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to "false doctrines" should their expectations be disappointed.
The Congressional reaction to the President's message was
generally favorable, for the progressively worsening situation
in the Par East gave Point Four a greater urgency than it had
possessed in January. The Par East was an area specifically
singled out for development, and a hope arose that the Chinese
and their neighbors might be enticed into the Western camp by of-
fering them aid not forthcoming from Soviet Russia. Some of the
influential legislators were pleased that the President had not
followed the counsels of those in the Administration who had
urged him to request an additional one billion dollars to guar-
antee private investments, but they were disappointed that the
program had been sent to the Hill when members were trying to
find time and money to deal with projects already on the calen-
dar. Speaker Rayburn and House Majority Leader John McCormack
(D-Mass.) were of the opinion that the program would be warmly
supported in the House if it were favorably reported by the For-
eign Affairs Committee. 49
One of the more objeetional opinions to President Truman's
message was given by Representative Robert F. Rich (R-Penn.) when
he said:
Now did anyone ever hear of the Government guaran-
teeing American business in this country against losing
money? No doubt a law of this kind in effect when Mr.
Truman was in the haberdashery business would have pre-
vented him from going into bankruptcy — the Government
would have bailed him out....
48 New York Times
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Is it not about time that Mr. Truman recognized
that we cannot finance everybody and every country all
over the world?. .. .Who does not have it in his heart to
help another man when he can do so? But when it is go-
ing to mean ruin to your own country to continue to
help a foreign country, then I say it is time to at-
tend to our own business. Let us cease to experiment
with theories and return to the fundamentals of sound
business practice which have withstood the test of the
years. 50
Jacob K. Javits expressed a favorable attitude toward the
Presidential message when he commented:
It cannot be overemphasized that about two-thirds
of the world's population — about 1,500,000,000 people —
live in the underdeveloped areas, and that only about
one-third of the world's population — something over
750,000,000 -- live in the developed areas and in the
areas in transition to development. It is the peoples
in the underdeveloped countries whom we are seeking to
aid. 51
He further emphasized his point by referring to an editorial
written in the New York Times called "investing in Peoples. "52
This editorial stressed the fact that what was required was an
investment not merely of money, but also of skill and understand-
ing the human being, and it was that investment that would pay
the big dividend. The example of the Philippines showed that the
United States had had some experience in this type of an invest-
ment. Our investment of money, public and private, was relative-
ly small. The machinery of the government was self-supporting
from the beginning, and the funds that were used for amelioration
and then for growth were largely of local origin. There was,
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however, an indirect investment in the policy of giving a prefer-
ential position in our markets to the island's major products
that, in turn, gave an economic advantage to the young country.
Our trade was mutually profitable. But, above and beyond this,
was the great investment in human skills, some American and some
Filipino. The application of those skills wrought a transform-
ation in the country in a comparatively short time. The dividend
took a variety of forms, such as the elimination of contagious
diseases such as smallpox, an increase in the number of children
attending school, and the general all-over rise in the Filipino's
standard of living.
The sane type of investment that was given in the Philip-
pines could be made in various parts of the world under the Point
Pour program. This would mean more than dollar investment. It
would mean giving enthusiasm and knowledge and coming to grips
with realities, with courage, and patience. It meant dealing
with people and not just countries with genuine ivarmth of
heart. 53
On July 2, drafts of two measures were submitted to the Sen-
ate. These drafts comprised most of what the President had re-
quested. The guarantees proposal was assigned to the Committee
on Banking and Currency, and the technical aid measure to the
Foreign Relations Committee. One brief proposed to amend the ex-
isting law to permit the Export-Import Bank to guarantee invest-
ments abroad by American private enterprise against risks "pecu-
53 Congressional Record
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liar to such investments." The second dealt with a program of
international exchange of technical knowledge. No specific sums
of money were proposed in either bill. The measure also called
for the establishment of an Institute of International Technical
Cooperation within the State Department. 54
In mid-summer, Senator Maybank (D-S. C.) and Representative
Spence (D-Ky.), chairman of the Senate and House Banking and Cur-
rency Committees, introduced identical bills providing for in-
vestment guarantees through the Export-Import 3ank. At the same
time, Representative John Kee (D-W. Va.) introduced the draft of
an International Technical Cooperation Act which would authorize
the President to plan and execute "technical cooperation pro-
grams," and in so doing to make advances and grants-in-aid to
any qualified person, foreign government, or international or-
ganization. 55
In the meantime, the Communist Party newspaper, Pravada,
charged that President Truman's Point Pour plan to aid underde-
veloped areas of the world was an attempt to replace British,
Dutch, and French colonial empires with a "world-wide American
monopoly." 56 Approximately the same time, the Turkish Govern-
ment circles frankly admitted that additional economic aid from
the United States was more needed than additional military as-
sistance, and the leading Turkish newspaper, Cumhuriyet, pub-
54 New York Times, July 2, 1949, 1:4.
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lished an article urging Turkey to start collecting data imme-
diately for eventual United States assistance under Point Four
err
projects. "'
George Hakim, counselor of the Lebanese Legation in Washing-
ton, D. C, declared that nothing had been put forward except a
limited program of technical assistance that would "barely
scratch the surface" of the problem and that nobody could be ex-
pected to be very much excited about the prospects of long-term
results from such work. He also said that Truman's program was
clearly envisaged as a method of preventing "economic recession
in the United States," and stressed the fact that underdeveloped
countries needed money and lots of it, to go along with technical
assistance. 58
Prime Minister Liagot Ali Khan of Iran said that the Point
Pour program was a step in the right direction, but how big a
step it would prove depended upon the amount of funds given for
this program. He said, "What is needed is a Truman plan for the
Middle East on the line of the Marshall Plan for Western Eur-
ope." 59
By now, much soul-searching and many questions had been
asked about the no;v-famous Point Pour, and interest in it had
been quickened by the fear of a domestic depression. Also, the
evidence seemed to be clear on all sides that, if the United
57 New York Times
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States was to make the European recovery program succeed, and,
if it were to answer the Communist challenge in the world, a
plan was needed to succeed the recovery program and to "oring
about world economic recovery. Jacob K. Javits believed that
there could be nothing more electrifying to the peoples of Asia
than a broad-scale effort by the United States to improve thei.
physical conditions of living, and that we could hold Asia
against Communism with soldiers or with diplomacy or with tra-
ditional influence, but that the mobilization of America's re-
sources in the skilled was the answer to the Communist challenge
in the world. 60
On August 18, the Administration's chief spokesman before
the House committees sought to dispel the rising conviction of a
number of Congressmen that the foreign countries involved should
underwrite investment risks, not the United States. 6 ^ He stressed
the point that the Administration bill would not provide guar-
antees covering ordinary business losses nor assure anyone of a
profit. 62
On September 27, shortly after the House Foreign Affairs
Committee had begun its hearings, a "comprehensive draft" of
Point Four legislation arrived from the Executive. It was termed
a "reminder" that the President wanted the program to be enacted
during the current session. The reminder was indeed comprehen-
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sive, for it outlined a scheme of technical assistance in nearly
20 fields in three principal geographic areas: the American re-
publics, the Near East and Africa, the Far East and Asia. The
proposed cost for 1950 was §85,500,000, of which one-third was
to be borne by the country receiving assistance and two-thirds
by either the United States or an appropriate international
agency. The reaction of Representative Joseph Martin (R-Hass.)
was that Point Four in this form would impair the national de-
fense. He declared that this country's security was more im-
portant than "charitable or benevolent deeds," and added that
"as a precautionary measure we should suspend now all spending
until we find out what we need for defense against the atom." 63
The same day, James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State, ap-
peared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He was given
a cool reception by numerous Republicans ivho objected to the
scope and cost of the program. Their hostility was sufficiently
intense to arouse concern lest bi-partisan cooperation in foreign
affairs be injured. Webb said the bill was not charity. It was
an enlightened businesslike attempt to solve one of the crucial
problems with which our world was confronted, and he pictured it
as a move "in the interest of world security as well as world
progress."64 Representative John Vorys (R-0.) was particularly
aroused. He described Webb's presentation as the "craziest thing
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I ever saw. .. .Rube Goldberg must have been your consultant." 65
The spokesman for the Administration sought to reassure the Com-
mittee by stressing the role of private enterprise, saying, "We
hope to do the minimum of public investment and encourage the
maximum of private investment." 66 In a long, strong voice for
the proposal, Javits said he thought he could "punch holes
through the bill" but approved it as "top-flight American policy
thinking — a real American answer to Communism."
Further assurance came from the testimony of Secretary of
Agriculture Brannan, who claimed that the sources of agricultural
assistance programs already operating in Central and South Amer-
ica augured well for the future of Point Four. He reminded the
Congressmen that only a prosperous nation could be a good cus-
tomer, and said he did not fear competition from newly-developed
nations because higher living standards \rould mean higher con-
sumption at home. Robert B. Chiperfield (R-Ill.), second-ranking
Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was unim-
pressed. "The millions that are to be spent on this program are
not chicken feed. The best success story this country could find
is for this Congress to adjourn and quit spending money right
now." 68
The hearings were given a new twist on September 30, when
Oscar Ewing, head of the Federal Security Agency, revealed in his
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testimony that, since health and education mould rank first on
the Point Four sgenda, his own PSA would be the operating agency
in the first phase of the program. The point of this, he said,
was that, while the United States ultimately sought the economic
rehabilitation of backward areas, it was first necessary to in-
crease the output of their workers. Ewing testified that the
President's project was directed against "the disease of social
unrest" and was not "a supply program or a give-away. "69
When Representative Burleson (D-Tex.) asked, "Then, as far
as private capital investment in those areas is concerned, that
is likely to be a thing far off in the future?", Ewing replied,
"That is true." Ewing' s testimony reminded Representative Vorys
of the case of a man who had recently been committed to Gallinger
Hospital, a mental institution, for giving away money to casual
acquaintances. Dismissing Ewing' s scheme as "just another give-
away plan," he said, "This man was sent to Gallinger. Perhaps
he should be in the Cabinet instead."'70
Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, told the House For-
eign Affairs Committee on October 4 that "it certainly is not
my idea that this is a give-away plan." He said it was a pro-
gram whereby this country intended to use its scientific know-
ledge, industrial techniques, and economic power to help other
nations "make progress against hunger, misery, and despair, the
ancient enemies of decent living."'
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On the same day, Dr. Katz-Suchy of Poland, before the United
Nations General Assembly's Economic and Financial Committee, said
that the Point Pour was an attempt to use the United Nations as a
disguise for the penetration of American "monopoly capital" into
colonial territories of Western European countries. Dr. C. Patyn
of the Netherlands characterized Dr. Katz-Such's views as "the
most complete nonsense." However, the Polish spokesman was
backed up by the Byelorussian delegate V. P. Smolyar, who argued
that Anglo-American financial assistance in underdeveloped coun-
tries represented "the uncontrolled, ruthless domination of mon-
opolies. "^
The most significant testimony of the final days of the hear-
ings was given by former Assistant Secretary of State Spruille
Braden, whose views were shared by the more conservative Republi-
can members of the committee. He believed the United States
should consider its own underdeveloped areas first, following
which he described the Administration's investment guarantees
bill as fundamentally in error because it sought to plan from
above on a global scale. In response to a question from Repre-
sentative John D. Lodge (R-Conn.), he said that guarantees might
actually discourage expansion of private capital overseas since
"government guarantees or insurance often are viewed with dis-
trust by the investor." He preferred to support the Herter bill
with its system of treaties. 73 A week later, having failed to
72 New York Times, October 5, 1949. 13:1.
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decide whether to endorse Representative Herter or the Adminis-
tration, the committee postponed further consideration of Point
Four until the new session in January.
Meanwhile, the House Banking and • Currency Committee had
agreed on a guarantees bill similar to a measure approved by the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee on September 20. Both of
the bills conferred a guarantees function on the Export-Import
Bank and both provided for insurance against loss through incon-
vertibility of currencies, and confiscation, seizure, or expro-
priation without adequate compensation. 74 The senate measure,
however, incorporated the Executive's request that investments
be covered by an all-inclusive guarantee against "all risks pe-
culiar to foreign investments." Among the risks included in this
category was physical destruction caused by war or similar dis-
turbance. The Senate bill carried with it no recommendation for
an appropriation, for the Export- Import Bank was expected to car-
ry on its new function with the #970,000,000 it held in uncom-
mitted funds. 75 During the course of the Senate hearings, the
guarantees proposal was endorsed by H. E. Gaston, chairman of the
board of the Export-Import Bank. Gaston summarized his opinion
of the bill in these words:
The enactment of the bill would not commit the
government to a program of any specific character of
magnitude. The legislation would merely vest in the
Bank.... the discretionary authority to exercise a
function. The guarantee function is closely allied
74 Hew York Times
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to and indeed is but an extension of the power which
the Bank has been exercising since 1934. 7fc>
Speaking to a convention of the Association of Land Grant
Colleges, Brannan, the Secretary of Agriculture, charged that the
President's program was not impractical and not costly. It was
not impractical, he said, since it had been successfully deraon-
strated in Latin America that American aid could promote produc-
tion and development. The charge that the cost would quadruple
taxation was denied as most of the investment abroad would be
provided by private capital. Another fallacy of the critics was
that the program would add competition for America's wheat, live-
stock, and cotton. If there was to be greater development in
foreign nations, they would need to buy more supplies such as
seed, breeding stock, and machinery, and these things would be
77
bought from the United States.'
Iran had become the first nation to announce a complete in-
dustrial, social, and economic development plan to take full ad-
vantage of Point Four. An increase in Iranian agriculture and in-
dustrial output of more than two hundred per cent during the next
7ft
seven years was the goal. '°
At the time Congress adjourned in October, it was certain
that several matters would have to be clarified before Point Four
could be shaped into law. Although the Administration had been
lavish in the number of words it had expended in urging Congress
76 New York Times, September 23, 1949, 3:1.
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to pass a bill, it had offered relatively few recommendations to
assist the legislators in their work. The Administration's bill
introduced in July was criticized by Republicans and Democrats
alike as being "too general." 79 its most serious weakness was
the absence of any provision for a soecific agency to administer
the program. Both the Herter bill and a substitute for the Ad-
ministration bill later proposed by Senator Saltonstall (R-Kass.)
would set up a Foreign Economic Development Administration to
handle Point Four affairs, including the. drafting of treaties,
making guarantees, and furnishing technical services. The ap-
pointment of the administrator would be subject to Senate con-
firmation. It was clear that this agency must be attached to the
State Department if Point Four were to be made an economic in-
strument of foreign policy. The draft of Senator Saltonstall 1 s
bill made as a pre-condition for the receipt of technical or
financial aid the signing of a treaty pledging no discrimination
against American capital privately- invested and promising that
the recipient government would not sponsor local corporations in
competition with those of the United States. The Saltonstall
bill was expected to provide a basis for general agreement when
Congress reconvened in January, 1950.80
Spokesmen for the business interests of America seemed, on
the whole, to favor the Point Four idea. Like Representative
Charles A. Eaton (R-H. J.), they were "tremendously pleased to
79New York Times
,
December 17, 1949, 7:1.
80Loc. cit.
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hear the words 'private capital' spoken over and over again."
But, like Messrs. Herter and Saltonstall, they stipulated res-
ervations on its use. Noel Sargent, Secretary of the National
Association of Manufacturers, said in July that American capital
was ready to invest up to two billion dollars annually on condi-
tion that the nations concerned were willing to "provide a polit-
ical and economic climate which makes foreign investment reason-
ably attractive to Americans." He suggested that a pilot bilat-
eral treaty be drawn up with a South American country to serve as
a pattern for other governments. Such a treaty, according to
Sargent, would commit the recipient country to put its financial
house in order, stabilize its currency, and guarantee that prof-
its be convertible into dollars. 81 These stringent and probably
unrealizable conditions undoubtedly were intended to avert the
need for government financial guarantees which Sargent deemed un-
acceptable on the grounds that they would discriminate against
investments previously made.
The United States Chamber of Commerce also accepted the prin-
ciples of Point Four, and the reservations it attached to its ap-
proval were more moderate than those of the National Association
of Manufacturers. The Chamber asked only that the program be
started on a modest scale (in deference to the budget and to
avoid charges of imperialism) and that reliance be made on pri-
vate capital, which again was to be sheltered by a screen of tre-
New York Times
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aties. The Chamber further urged that the liability of the Ex-
port-Import Bank be limited to five hundred million dollars, and
wished that the government make clear that "it has no intention
of providing loans for economic development in fields which are
appropriate for private investment."82
American capital thus offered its support, however quali-
fied, to the "bold new program" envisaged by the President in
January. Without the adherence of American capital, the program
would lack the leaven of private enterprise originally called for
by the President, and might indeed become the International WFA
so much disliked by its early critics. It remained for the sec-
ond session of the 81st Congress to enact legislation in harmony
with the requirements of American business, thereby assuring the
Administration of its continued support.
82 Hew York Times
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PASSAGE OP THE BILL
Point Four of President Truman's inaugural address was vir-
tually nothing more than an idea almost one year after he de-
clared that the United States "must embark on a "bold, new pro-
gram" to aid the underdeveloped areas of the world. It was true
that the program received dual consideration by the first session
of the Slst Congress and that the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development and the Export-Import Bank had made
some loans that could be regarded as supporting Point Four; but
this was far from a full-scale program.
Willard A. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State, found that
business was beginning to lose interest in the proposed guaran-
tees. Those investors who already had capital in foreign coun-
tries were more interested in having their current funds "unfroz-
en" before seeking additional situations in which to invest. In
addition, State Department officials learned that private capital
could not be attracted to the underdeveloped areas until the
countries themselves had made some progress. 1
President Truman, in his State of the Union Address on Janu-
ary 4, 1950, to Congress, said:
An expanding world economy requires the improve-
ment of living standards and the development of re-
sources in areas where human poverty and misery now
prevail. Without such improvement, the recovery of
Europe and the future of our own economy will not be
secure. I urge that the Congress adopt the legislation
Hew York Times
,
January 5, 1950, 85:1.
SO
now before it to provide for increasing the flow of
technical assistance and capital investment in under-
developed regions. ...This program is in the interest
of all peoples, and has nothing in common with either
the old imperialism of the last century or the new im-
perialism of the Communist. .. .Recent world events make
prompt action imperative.
2
The House Foreign Affairs Committee reopened hearings Janu-
ary 13, 1950, on Point Pour. The program legislatively was in
two parts. The measure that was up for consideration, which was
written in general terms, would authorize this country to give a
variety of technical assistance in health, education, agricul-
ture, and industry to backward areas. The administration had es-
timated that the first cost to this country would be about 35 mil-
lion dollars. Another bill followed which would provide for gov-
ernment guarantees of private loans made abroad for economic de-
velopment. The central intention was to strengthen non-Communist
countries socially and industrially.
The same day, President Truman at his Press Conference con-
ferred with Winthrop W. Aldrich, banker, who was chairman of a
Presidential committee on financing foreign trade. Aldrich said
he was "enthusiastically interested" in Point Four, which might
bring a "good flow" of private investment abroad if it were set
up "in precisely the right way."3
Dr. Ray Moyer, Acting Head of the Economic Cooperation Ad-
ministration mission in Formosa, told the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee that Point Four would be "a very important weapon in our
o
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1*4foreign policy. Dr. Prank Laubach of the Foreign Missions
Conference of North America told the Committee: "The churches
all over America are being alerted for this bill. The churches
are going to be keenly disappointed unless the rest of the world
is satisfied with the bill."5 The director of the Washington Of-
fice of the United Auto Workers, Donald Montgomery, said he spoke
for the entire CIO in endorsing the proposal, but said the organ-
ization was opposed to guarantees that would be required from
beneficiary areas under a measure suggested by Representative
Christian A. Herter. He described provisions in Herter's bill as
amounting "to onerous and humiliating conditions of special fa-
voritism for United States corporations." 6
Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick, former President of the Rockefeller
Foundation, accepted the chairmanship of a committee on technical
assistance set up by the American Association for the United Na-
tions. The committee was established to stress the role of the
United Nations in the proposed program for technical assistance
to economically backward areas, as put forth by President Tru-
man. The new committee planned to conduct a country-wide educa-
tional drive that would sell the assistance plan as a program to
help people help themselves and as a project that affected the
common interests of the people of the United States.
The Administration and Republican forces in the House's For-
"Act for International Development," Hearing s before the
Committee on Foreign Affair s (H. R. 61089), pT~366.
5 Ibid
., p. 333.
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eign Affairs Committee united informally January IV on a compro-
mise bill to provide technical assistance under Point Pour, Wil-
lard A. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State, and Representative
C. A. Herter of Massachusetts, leader of a Republican group that
opposed the original Administration bill, gave their endorsement
at a hearing to the draft of a compromise presented by Represen-
tative John Kee (D-W. Va.), the committee chairman.
The compromise measure was designed to meet demands, among
others, for the stating of conditions and policy under which the
United States would help finance technical cooperation programs
and provide knowledge and skills in the development of resources
and production in the so-called "backward" areas. While putting
the administration of the law under the President instead of an
independent agency as proposed by Herter, the new bill would re-
quire him to seek the participation of the United Nations, other
international organizations, and private agencies "wherever prac-
ticable." A number of conditions for providing assistance under
bi-lateral programs were also stipulated, including cooperation
with other participants in the exchange of technical knowledge
and skills, coordination of technical programs within the recipi-
ent country, and payment of "a fair share" of the cost. In a
statement of Congressional policy, the bill sought to remove
fears of discrimination against private investors of the United
States or seizure of their property without prompt compensation.
An advisory board "broadly representative of groups interested
in the program" was to be created under the new bill, although
the board would not have the veto powers suggested by some crit-
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ics of the original Administrative proposal."''
President Truman sent a report to Congress January 20 urg-
ing a removal of tax deterrents. The report was designed to at-
tract private investment capital in support of Point Pour.
Endorsement of Point Pour legislation introduced in the
House in the identical bills of Representative John Kee and
Christian A. Herter was voiced by the national Foreign Trade
Council. In a telegram to Chairman Kee, the Council declared
promotion of private enterprise abroad "is a fundamental of Amer-
ican foreign economic policy and Point Pour specifically." The
telegram went on to say:
We note with great pleasure that a bipartisan ap-
proach has been exemplified by introduction of identi-
cal bills by yourself and Congressman Herter. .. .Our
conviction reinforced by expressions of the 36th Na-
tional Foreign Trade Convention is that promotion of
private enterprise abroad is a fundamental of American
foreign economic policy and Point Four specifically.
We are somewhat disappointed that the scope of
Governmental activities in technical assistance is
not more clearly defined and limited to fields in
which the Government has demonstrated reasonable com-
petence, but believe that ultimate review and control
of such activities may be made effective through pro-
cedures as to appropriations and periodic reports to
the Congress."
It hailed Section two and three of the bills, H. R. 6834 and
H. R. 6835 as aiding in the objective of facilitating private in-
vestment through the negotiations of bi-lateral treaties with
foreign nations.
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Wilbert Ward, vice-president of National City Bank of Hew
York, said:
It is disturbing to find that disinclination of
Government to accept the business viewpoint persists
in current discussions with respect to implementing
President Truman's Point Pour. The President's thesis
was simple. It was that American capital should go
abroad on a private enterprise basis to stop the drain
of the taxpayers' dollars, of which about thirty bil-
lion dollars have been committed for loans or gifts to
foreign governments since the end of World War II.
°
President Truman's Point Four program was assailed by James
P. Warburg, banker, economist, and author. He criticized it as
being too little and not freely given. Large amounts of capital,
termed by Warburg "seed money," must be distributed without any
strings attached. Warburg, in a speech before members of the
Town Hall Club, said our Point Pour program "should be a lion
and not a mouse. "^ He reiterated his belief that the program
must be world-wide in scope, not limited to the so-called under-
developed areas, and he proposed that it be channeled through the
United Nations.
In Senator Brien McMahon's (D-Conn.) address on the hydro-
gen bomb, he made the following proposal:
We now spend about $15,000,000,000 annually for
armaments. Why not offer to take two-thirds of this
sum, or ;J10,000,000,000, and instead of amassing ster-
ile weapons use it to foster peace throughout the
world for a five-year period? Why not offer to spread
the annual §10,000,000,000 over three programs: Pres-
ident Truman's Point Four proposal, development of
atomic energy everywhere for peace, and general eco-
nomic aid to help all countries, including Russia?
Hew York Times
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Such a global Marshall Plan might combine with
the marvelous power of peacetime atomic energy to gen-
erate universal material progress and a universal co-
operative spirit. 11
James P. Warburg hailed Senator McMahon's proposal for
world-wide economic recovery program as "the turning point in
post-war United States policy" and "a mighty weapon for peace
In a Newsweek article, "Fifty Billions for Tribute?" Henry
Hazlitt said:
Senator McMahon himself calls his oroposal (of 50
billion over five years) a "global Marshall Plan" and
casually drops Point Pour inside it. It is a super-
giveaway program. It is not only politically pre-
posterous, but rests on the same fundamentally false
economic assumptions as the Marshall Plan and" Point
Four. It wrongly assumes that the American capital
thrown into such schemes is a net addition to the
world's capital. It is, in fact, a mere diversion of
such capital and it is a diversion, in the main, from
productive private enterprises into far less orodue-
tive collectivist projects. 13
Persons who were looking for indications of how the Point
Four program for aiding the peoples of underdeveloped areas could
be worked out should attach some importance to recent reports
from Liberia. There a development program, based on a combina-
tion of private investment and Lend-Lease grants, was being car-
ried through its first stages. The new port operations at Mon-
rovia were to be in full swing by the first of May. Earlier im-
petus to Liberia's development had been given by the Firestone
Rubber Plantations. They brought in a new source of wealth which
11 New York Times
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accounted for three-fourths of the country's exports in 1943.
The Lend-Lease program had a somewhat different base. It was
designed to improve the harbor, build bridges, provide access
road, and supply both storage facilities and power sources. Bet-
ter facilities for trade were designed to broaden the base of
Liberia' s production and to increase total trade by as much as
40 per cent within five years. In this way, Liberia was becom-
ing something of a "pilot plant" for Point Four. The little
African republic might well show what could be done in raising
standards and making people more prosperous and happy.
The United States Inter-American Council, part of the Inter-
American Council of Commerce and Production, filed strong objec-
tions to the proposal for Government guarantee of American
"Point Pour" investments abroad. The Council called the Point
Pour investment guarantee program "basically unsound and objec-
tionable." It said recipient countries might try to protect
themselves against making payments, and if local government cap-
ital was involved along with United States money, "it would tend
toward socialistic ventures." Prom that base the criticism con-
tinued:
Serious international complications may result if
the capital exporting nation is forced to take over any
of the assets of its nationals, forcing the government
of the exporting nation to participate in ownership or
operation in the territory of an independent nation,
causing widespread repercussions on the credit, finan-
ces, and policies of that country.
The council contended further:
That the basic error is compounded if guarantees are
limited to new investors when old investors have oper-
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ated under risks involved without government assist-
ance. Guarantees should "be given by the recipient
country instead of the capital exporting countries.
^
4
Samuel P. Haye3, Jr., Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Walter K. Kits-
chnig, Director of the State Department's Office of United Na-
tions Economic and Social Affairs, emphasized the "self-help"
aspect of the Administration's Point Pour program. They declared
that mere expenditures without training in "know-how," would not
induce private capital to invest in backward countries. Hayes
said the program required international participation, and that
the dominance of one country should be avoided.-1-^
Representative C. A. Herter, at the 79th annual meeting of
the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers,
said resistance in many countries to foreign investments, being
concerned with emotions, must be treated delicately. Ho single
pattern could be used everywhere. Methods that have offered suc-
cess in different countries would be used to help develop in
other countries the "climate" in which American investors would
be willing to operate. The legislator warned against any "hand-
out program," which he declared would antagonize other nations
and might create situations in which new investors would gain un-
fair advantages over existing ones. Government money should be
invested only where private enterprise would not function, and
then only through sound operations by the World Bank and the Ex-
New York Times, February 6, 1950, 31:2.
15 Ibid
., February 12, 1950, 4:2.
58
port-Import Bank, which do not have surplus funds. Wise de-
velopment of resources in other countries could help fill the
needs of the United States for strategic materials and at the
same time do as much "as almost anything else" to strengthen
those countries against the "ideological scourge" threatening
the world. 16
Assistance by this country to underdeveloped areas of the
world to encourage the democratic forces in those regions and to
curb the danger of war was endorsed by two speakers before a meet-
ing of the League of Women Voters. The speakers were Anna Lord
Strauss, National President of the League, and Josephine Schain,
Foreign Policy Chairman of the League. Both speakers said they
had found considerable suspicion among foreigners about this
country's motives in extending aid to other parts of the world.
They also reported that Communist propagandists were active, par-
ticularly among the Asiatics, in spreading charges that Americans
were guilty of discrimination against the Negroes. Miss Strauss
declared that American aid under the Marshall Plan and Point Four
was absolutely essential, but warned that "we must not expect to
see quick results." 1,7
In Alexander, Virginia, at the unveiling of a statue of
George Washington, President Truman declared thus:
We are not trying to sell them automobiles and
television sets. Our purpose is to helD them to grow
more food, to obtain better education, and to be more
New York Times
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healthy. That is the way they can gain the physical
and moral strength to be free and to maintain their
own governments.
As these nations prove to themselves and to others
the effectiveness of free institutions in meeting their
people's needs, they will show as nothing else can the
true value of democracy and the false claims of Commu-
nism. 18
The Foreign Policy Association cited, in a report by Warren
Wilhelm, the progress of Soviet development of four backward
countries in Central Asia to demonstrate that the proposed Point
Pour program would not necessarily cost "formidable amounts of
money." The report stated that the need for new outside capital
by backward areas envisaged under Point Pour would be greatly les-
sened if local resources were fully exploited for increasing pro-
duction. It was added that the Soviet Union managed the develop-
ment program without lowering the living standards of the area
under development.
Disappointment that Bills H. R. 6834 and H. R. 6835 regard-
ing Point Four legislation had been superseded by H. R. 7346 was
expressed by the National Foreign Trade Council in a telegram to
Representative John Kee, who had introduced H. R. 7346 on Febru-
ary 20. The changes, the council held, substantially weakened
the emphasis on the development by this country through bi-later-
al arrangements of an effective program of foreign economic as-
sistance. Referred to particularly was Section Four, which made
it mandatory for the United States to accomplish the purposes of
1ft Hew York Times
, February 23, 1950, 3:2.
19 warren Wilhelm, a former Government economist, and now as-
sociated with Harvard University' s Russian Research Center.
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the act by participation in multilateral programs carried on by
the United Nations and other international organizations wher-
ever practicable, and specifically authorized contributions to
these organizations for this purpose, limited only by the total
amount of the appropriations.
Secretary of the Treasury, John W. Snyder, told the Mexico
Pilgrims Foundation, Inc., at a dinner forum that "very little
new American private capital" had moved into areas other than
Venezuela, Canada, and the Near East, and into industries other
than petroleum. If such capital was to be attracted, he said, it
must be assured in advance by the foreign countries involved that
it would be secure from confiscation and that reasonable earnings
could be transferred into American dollars. He declared that:
Such assurances our Government is endeavoring to
obtain through the negotiation of bi-lateral invest-
ment treaties. This Government placed great stress on
these treaties as concrete evidence that foreign coun-
tries do want our private capital and that they are
prepared to afford it a fair opportunity to be nut to
effective use. 20
The second speaker at the dinner forum, Spruille Braden,
former United States Ambassador to Argentine, took issue with Sny-
der on the Government's role in fostering greater foreign invest-
ment.
No Government — still less the United Nations
except in a few fields possesses the scientific and
industrial knowledge, experiences, and techniques to
implement Point Four.
.. .Nor are public officials
usually equipped to play the role of promoter, indus-
trialist, or bankers. 21
Braden also observed that the proposal for Government guarantees
20 New York Times
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of investments was "unsound" and would not do the job. Such
guarantees, he said, would be "squandered or filched by the fly-
by-night or crooked adventures" and involve the United States in
bad deals. 22
Methods by which advertising could be used to improve Amer-
icans' understanding of world economic and social problems were
to have immediate and intensive study by the Advertising Coun-
cil, it was announced March 9, 1950, by Samuel C. Gale, the newly
elected Chairman. The decision to investigate an advertising
campaign as a medium for making the American public aware of
factual information on international problems was the result of
speeches made by Paul G. Hoffman, Sconomic Cooperation Adminis-
trator, in October, 1949, and by Secretary of State Dean Acheson
in February, 1950. In answer to questions whether such a "world-
problems" campaign would not involve political controversy, Theo-
dore S. Repplier, reelected President of the Council, emphasized
that such a campaign would be "purely an understanding campaign."
Basically, it was pointed out, the campaign would present ideas
and information and allow the public to make its own decisions. es
According to the Foreign Policy Association, "the United
States must teach the world's backward peoples to delay marriage
and reduce their birth rates if the Point Four program is to suc-
ceed." 24 In a report prepared by J. B. Condliffe, Director of
22 New York Times
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the University of California's Teaching Institute, the question
of population increase was declared to be a major factor in eco-
nomic development. It was stated that educational processes
should be used to reinforce the desire for improved living stand-
ards. Condliffe said that these proposals run counter to the
"traditional folkways" and, therefore, progress would be slow.
He went on to say:
But, economic development, if it is to succeed,
must be a slow process of remaking the social organ-
ization and aspirations of communities that for cen-
turies have followed a pattern of behavior inherited
from time immemorial.-5
Secretary of State Acheson's plan, which was released by the
State Department, called for active cooperation of the American
cooperation of the American people with those of basically demo-
cratic countries in countering "all thrusts of the Soviet Union."
It also put strong emphasis on a need for increasing Americans'
understanding of world problems.
On March 21, the House Foreign Affairs Committee authorized
45 million dollars for Point Pour, including 10 million dollars
for the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. A preliminary count
of noses in the House indicated that the request of 45 million
dollars for Point Four would be approved, if at all, only by the
narrowest of margins. Herter asked the House to think twice be-
fore rejecting all funds for the purpose because "too many people
around the world are looking to us for this little bit of heln."26
25 New York Times
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Republican Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey was roundly applauded
by supporters and opponents of the measure ivhen he said:
We want to tell our friends across the sea and
the Russians who are carefully watching us that Amer-
ica is still on the job and that we do not propose to
let free men down. The grim reality is that this is
more than a piece of legislation we have before us.
It is a program that represents one of the great-
est contributions to the security and hope of mankind
and to the safety of the United States. It has erected
a wall against the Communistic philosophy of hate, fear,
and ruin and taken Europe out of the abyss of despair
and given it new hope. 2"
Representative John Kee said that he had heard many conflict-
ing views expressed in regard to the proposal, but that in all
his years of experience as a member of the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee:
I have never known a hearing upon any other mea-
sure to attract a greater attendance of apparently
deeply interested listeners. It can also be said that
but few, if any, measures ever referred to this commit-
tee have had as many and as strong supporters, and this
support comes from men and women in all walks of life. 28
Succeeding speakers expressed agreement that, except for the
Marshall Plan, the entire continent of Europe would be under Com-
munistic domination as far as the English Channel. But the op-
position was yet to be heard from, and the economy advocates had
not yet taken the floor. Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee postponed action on the Point Four program authoriza-
tion, deciding to await the outcome of debate in the House.
President Truman warned the economy bloc in Congress that
07 New York Times
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64
its threatened slash of recovery funds for other nations mould
create the risk of World War III. in a letter to Representative
John Kee, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Truman urged favorable action on the omnibus foreign aid bill.
He said:
These measures are not acta of charity. Neitherare they a waste of the resources of the United Stat^They are, indeed the keystone of our protection against
JSpSzTsrss atoSc^eV* 1
- and against the te-^
Our armed forces can afford us a measure of de-fense but real security for our nation and all therest of mankind can come only from building the kind
£*ES^/here men can live together in pelce. Se
wo^lri J£tei, tu??ed " s baok uP°n *e rest of therld after the first World War. Some twenty yearslater, we found that we had to fight another- World WarWe cannot afford to follow that course again. We will*save nothing if we ignore the needs of other nationsnow only to find that the result is World War III?29
Reports from the capital indicated that the economy advo-
cates claimed Democratic as well as Republican support for their
objective of making a substantial cut, primarily in the funds
earmarked for European recovery. No figures were mentioned in
the President's letter, but he clearly implied that he still was
standing firm for the full amount he called on Congress to auth-
orize. He commented that failure to enact the full amount would
do irreparable damage and that we could not live isolated in rel-
ative wealth and abundance.
Anticipating a drive to eliminate Point Four funds from the
House measure, Jacob K. Javits (H-N. Y.) said Point Pour should
29 New York Times
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not be made a target of opposition because it first had been pro-
posed by the President and not by Congress. He told the House:
As a matter of fact, all the President did was to
blow up into a major statement of policy an activity
which had been going along very successfully under the
Institute of Inter-American Affairs since 1942.30
Representative Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.) made the fol-
lowing statement to the House:
Whether we wish it or not, the Nation has been
thrust into a determining position in the Western
World. We shall rejoice in. the opportunity or shrink
from its implications, depending on the degree of our
confidence in ourselves and our Nation. 31
To put further emphasis on his statement, Ribicoff quoted Abraham
Lincoln: "We cannot escape history. We of this Congress and Ad-
32
ministration will be remembered in spite of ourselves." During
the same debate Representative Harold Dunbar Cooley (D-N. C.)
said he was reminded that President Roosevelt once said that
"there is a mysterious cycle in human events. To some genera-
tions much is given. Of others much is expected. This genera-
tion has a rendezvous with destiny. "33
Representative Thomas S. Gordon (D-Ill.) was in favor of
Point Four because he believed it to be a realistic policy that
furthered the interest of the United States. He said:
There are dollars involved, to be sure, but they
are dollars to finance the export of American know-how.
It is not a grant or loan program. It makes good sense
30 New York Times
,
March 28, 1950, 23:1.
31 Congres sional Record
,
81st Congress, 2nd Session, p. 4139.
32 Loc. cit.
33 Ibid
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because it gets down to fundamentals. It proposes to
use expert knowledge to get lasting improvements. Its
aim is economic development, and the benefits come to
us as well as to those who get our help. Point Pour
gets maximum effort and results for a minimum expendi-
ture. ^4
Secretary of State Achcson urged the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to hasten in authorizing 45 million dollars. He
said that a quick enactment would have salutary effect on the
free countries of Asia, on the Middle East, and on Latin America.
Delay, he said, would be interpreted in those areas as a lack of
interest in a program upon which they had been putting very
great hopes.
Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-H. J.) and Senator J. William
Purbright (D-Ark.) questioned whether a whole new bill was needed
to broaden technical assistance already authorized by the Smith-
Mundt Act. They suggested that an amendment of the law might be
more feasible. Smith likewise feared that the proposal's prog-
ress might be jeopardized by attaching it to ECA. He pointed out
that EGA was popularly accepted as a temporary expedient, to end
in 1952, whereas Point Pour program was expected to be a continu-
ing process.
Senator Tom Connally (D-Tex.) was the most critical of the
proposal. He doubted the wisdom of contributing any of the 45
million dollars to the agencies of the United Nations. He be-
lieved they would "chisel half of it" and would "mess it all
up," contending that the United States would be better advised
- Congressional Record
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to keep sole control of any assistance it offered to foreign coun-
tries.
On March 31, 1950, the House passed and sent to the Senate
a 25 million dollar foreign aid bill. The vote was 287 yeas,
86 nays, and 58 not voting. In rapid order, the Democratic ma-
jority headed off amendments to the Point Pour program which
would:
Prevent United States participating in any tech-
nical assistance programs jointly with the United Na-
tions. The measure as passed authorized these pro-
grams both bi-laterally and jointly with the United
Nations.
Limit to 40 per cent of the cost of joint tech-
nical assistance programs the United States contri-
bution to their financing.
Bar technical assistance to recipient nations
found to be "exploiting" colonial possessions or de-
pendent areas. 35
It was not until Speaker Sam Rayburn took the floor in sup-
port of Point Pour that any speaker received the individual at-
tention of the members. There was never a time when the United
States needed friends all over the world as it needed them now,
Rayburn told the House. He said there never were more dangerous
tines for the people of the remaining free nations of the world.
He described the amount authorized in the bill as a "paltry sum"
when measured against the need of the nation for friends and the
importance of making these friends strong in order that they
could "hold the line until we can get there" in event of another
°° New York Times, April 1, 1950, 1:8.
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conflict. Rayburn went on to say that it was to bo hoped that
there would not be another war, but added that "nobody can pene-
trate the workings of a dictator's mind nor pierce the strong
heart of people who deny liberty and destroy democracy wherever
they find it in the world."36
An unfamiliar quiet gripped the House as Rayburn spoke, and
it prevailed until he had yielded the floor. His remarks were in
striking contrast to the initial stages of the day's debate when
Representative Pat Sutton (D-Tex.) brought cheers for his sug-
gestion that "we should tell Russia to go straight to hell, and
rtri
if they don't go there, we should send them." In the same de-
bate issue, Sutton remarked:
Let us get America back on a sound basis, balance
our budget, and quit this deficit spending. With the
debt we now have and the condition the world is in to-
day, some country has to be on a sound basis. I say it
should be America. This is not an issue between democ-
racy and communism; this is Point Pour legislation. My
answer to communism is build America strong. 38
Throughout the day, Republican members attacked the Point
Four program as Communist-inspired and as a blueprint for a "world-
wide WPA." Representative Smith, the Vi'isconsin Republican, said
the program was not so "bold" as it was dangerous. He went on to
say:
Truman in his address was only parroting the words
of a notorious character in the international world --
none other than Earl Browder. . .
.
This is public planning on a global scale, and the
36 New York Times, April 1, 1950, 1:8.
317 Congressional Record , 81st Congress, 2nd Session, p. 4527.
38 Loc. cit.
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American taxpayer will be asked to foot the bill.
This would just be a start with the sky as the limit.
It would just get a foot in the door.39
Representative Dewey Short (D-Mo.) said, in opposition to
the bill:
Times and men change, but there are certain
truLhs that are eternal and unalterable. You cannot
as the head of your family, you cannot as the head ofyour corporation or business, you cannot as the head
of any government — local, state, or national —
continue to spend more than you take in without get-ting into serious difficulties. You cannot dance
without paying the fiddler. Your chickens will comehome to roost.
*
u
Congressman Chatham (B-N. C.) said that he thought this bill
was the most forward-looking piece of legislation that had been
before the Congress in his time. He also made the remark that
he had been called a Republican many times, and that he was proud
of the fact that he was for the American business. He concluded
by saying that he hoped "you Republicans will join with us in
putting over this program.
"
41
(Mrs.) Katharine St. George (R-N. Y. ) was not necessarily
opposed to the bill, but she simply could not see that it had any
part in the present legislation. Section 301 of the bill read:
"This title may be cited as the 'Act for International Develop-
ment-" and Representative St. George thought this was exactly
what it should be.
h-v,
S0
-,5
ef
^
re we embark uP°n another program to savetne world, before we embark upon business all over the
39
45ig ^
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world, we should stop and consider. .. .If it is so good,
ivhy can it not stand on its own merits? Why can it not
be debated as a separate Diece of legislation?42
Representative John W. Byrnes (R-Wis.) also felt that Point
Four was out of place in this bill and that it was a completely
new program.
Representative Abraham J. Multer (D-K. Y. ) , to override
charges of communistic doctrine, quoted from an article "Words,
Bombs, and Enterprise" from the New York Herald Tribune of
March 28, 1950.
If the Point Four program were a shrewdly refur-
bished WPA for the world, congressional opposition to
it would be praiseworthy. The fact is that the pro-
gram is admirably consistent with the worthiest tradi-
tions of American enterprise. The leading role would
be played by private, capital. Utmost reliance would be
placed on private technicians and managers. Govern-
ment's role would be enrolling, not controlling....
Congress cannot reject the program without rejecting
its responsibility to fight against Communism by work-
ing for democracy. 43
Representative Herter sponsored the 20-million dollar cut
in the Point Four funds. He told the House the program would be
a better one in the long run for having started modestly. The
small appropriation would make it necessary, he said, to exercise
greater care in selection of personnel. His amendment as ap-
proved also provided for a 16-thousand dollar a year director to
be appointed by the President and to be confirmed by the Senate,
and directed that existing agencies must be called on to pro-
vide needed personnel.
42 Congressional Record
, 31st Congress, 2nd Session, p. 4528.
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While the House was completing action on the foreign-aid
authorization, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee cited Com-
munist victories in China to support its contention that a con-
tinued European Recovery Program vraa needed.
According to an article in Time
, United States businessmen
were not too impressed with the passage of a 25-mlllion dollar
aid bill. While the Administration dawdled and Congress argued,
businessmen had boldly gone ahead with their own private Point
Pour plans. Despite currency and trade restrictions, shaky gov-
ernments, and threats to nationalize Industry, United States busi-
nessmen had been willing to take chances. For example, the first
of five projects to help modernize Persia under a seven-year plan
had gotten underway. This project, costing six million dollars,
was started by Manhattan's Kennedy-Van Saun Manufacturing and En-
gineering Corporation with the shipment of equipment for a 200-
ton-a-day cement plant at Shiraz. Around the plant would be
built a model city, complete with hospitals, electric lights,
and so forth.
Some Point Four planners in Washington thought that reluc-
tance to invest abroad would be overcome by guarantees from
United States investors for losses overseas. But many business-
men took a harder-headed view. Chairman Philip D. Reed of Gen-
eral Electric, which had had 85 million dollars abroad since the
war's end, stated: "What is needed is a real desire on the part
4^ MNeeded: An Open Door," Time
. April 10, 1950, 55:81.
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of foreign countries for American private capital and 'know-how'
to come to their countries." 45 In short, it was up to the for-
eign nations and not the United States to open the door to United
States businessmen and guarantee them a square deal. If the door
was open and the deal looked good, United States business was
showing that it needed no other incentive to move right in.
Warren R. Austin, United States representative to the United
Nations, said that it was essential that the organization obtain
a share in carrying out the proposed Point Pour program. To add
emphasis to this point he said:
We Americans are far from having a monopoly of the
skills that are needed in the underdeveloped areas.
For another thing, it is much easier for some countries
to enter into this kind of cooperative endeavor with
the United Nations than it is for them to do it with
our country alone. It is an unhapoy fact that some
people mistrust our motives and fear that our aid
will lead to some kind of American imperialism. Also
they are naturally and rightly proud of their own
countries and don't like the idea of seeming to take
charity from us. All of these difficulties — and they
are very real — are avoided when a large part of the
program is channeled through the United Nations. 46
Spokesman for the Protestant Church organizations told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States must
guard against trying to "buy" friends with foreign aid programs.
Dr. Walter van Kirk, representing the Federal Council of Churches
of Christ in America, said the program should be undertaken in
cooperation with the United Nations. He did not think "friends
"Needed: An Open Door," Time
, April 10, 1950, 55:82.
46 New York Times
, April 1, 1950, 3:4.
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can be bought" with a unilateral program. 47 Clarence E. Pic-
kett, representing the American Friends (Quaker) Service Commit-
tee, said it would be "fatal" to use foreign aid "to further pol-
itical ideolog-- and not primarily because of our interest in
helping underdeveloped people."'*"
On April 4, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted
eleven to nothing to restrict the House-approved Point Four pro-
gran for elevating the economies and living standards of the
world. The Committee voted to limit the plan to the provision
of technical aid and skills. It rejected a House provision of-
fering United States Government guarantees or other devices as a
means of encouraging the flow of private investment capital into
countries participating in the program. If Congress wanted to
provide such guarantees, the Committee decided it could be done
through separate legislation. A bill proposing guarantee of pri-
vate investment abroad was now under study by the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency.
The Foreign Relations Committee acted against the background
of a Presidential recommendation that technical cooperation pro-
grams be carried to areas where countries had not been able to
develop fully their resources, productive capacities, and for-
eign trade. Also, the Senate Committee limited the urogram to
five years; the House put no limit. Under both House and Senate
rules no single program would run longer than three years. The
"Act for International Development," Hearing s Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate 64973), p. 4-37
Senate Hearings
,
p. 45.
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Senate voted 45 million dollars, the amount asked by the Admin-
istration, and cut the salary of the Administrator to 15 thous-
and dollars. The Senate rejected the House provision calling for
negotiations, including collective bargaining in backward areas
for the establishment of "fair labor standards of wages and work-
ing conditions."
Both branches appeared to be in general agreement in seek-
ing to provide that the President would make Point Pour assist-
ance available only when:
(1) The country being assisted paid a fair share
oi the cost of the program.
(2) The participating country Provided all neces-
sary information it had on the subjects involved andgave the aid full publicity.
(5) The participating country sous-ht the "great-
est possible" coordination of the technical assistance
programs
.
(4) The country involved cooperated with other
participating countries in the mutual exchange of tech-
nical knowledge and skills. 49
The House and Senate Committee decisions appeared to be in harmony
concerning general authorizations to the President to carry out
the program.
Senator Tom Connally (D-Tex.), Chairman of the Foreign Re-
lations Committee, said he planned to introduce the committee
decisions as an amendment to the Senate's omnibus foreign aid
bill when it reached the floor.
William E. Knox, President of Westinghouse Electric Inter-
national Company, said:
49 New York Times
, April 5, 1950, 1:4.
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In my opinion two things must be done before
Point Four can become a motivating force in the world
working to the detriment of Communist plans. A clim-
ate agreeable to American venture capital must be es-
tablished by the foreign countries wishing to be as-
sisted, and there must be incentive for American ven-
ture capital to go abroad, taking with it the manager-
ial and technical "know-how" and the private enterprise
incentive system which has worked out so well in this
country.
The only incentive that can conceivably attract a
large volume of additional American venture' capital is
a tax incentive. 50
The conflicting points of view existing in Congress and in
the country regarding the programs for the development of under-
developed areas were illustrated anew by the proposal of Senator
Edwin C. Johnson (D-Col.) that we invest billions in it, and the
action of the House in slashing the first funds requested to
25 million. Morris L. Cooke, Chairman of the President's Water
Resources Policies Commission, said Point Pour should receive
greater financial support than the 25 to 45 million dollar appro-
priation proposed in Congress. He said that he expected Point
Four expenditures to be looked upon ultimately as a "good invest-
ment whatever heights they reach." There was "no less-expensive
method to accomplish the master wish of our people peace, se-
curity, and prosperity," he declared. 51 Cooke urged American in-
stitutions of higher learning to equip and enthuse students for
service abroad, and called upon technicians and engineers to work
toward social obiectives.
New York Times
, April 8, 1950, 20:1.
51 Ibid
., April 12, 1950, 7:1.
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The "servicio approach," an administrative device for inter-
national cooperation developed by the Institute of Inter-American
Affairs, a unit of the State Department, seemed likely of adop-
tion for the United States bi-lateral Point Pour program. Under
this device, contained in the bill pending in the House, the
President would establish an Institute of International Technical
Cooperation which would have the same director as the IIAA and
would use its "know-how'' on a world-wide basis. 5^
In an address before the 54th annual meeting of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, James P. V/arburg de-
clared that Senator Brien McKahon's 50-billion five-year aid plan
for world-wide recovery should be shorn of its conditional pro-
visions and endorsed as this country's policy. He emphasized
that the plan must not be made conditional, as the Senator sug-
gested, on the Soviet Union's acceptance of international control
of atomic energy and reduction of military expenditures. George
Kaklin, counselor of the Labanese Legation in Washington, told
the meeting that the present proportions of President Truman's
Point Pour were too small to provide any effective contribution
toward economic recovery in underdeveloped countries. These
countries needed "no less than a social revolution involving the
transformation of a semi-feudal reactionary social order into a
new industrial system under which the forces of production can
develop and expand freely so as to raise the standards of living
Hew York Times , April 12, 1950, 7:1.
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as a whole." 5,5 Professor Owen Lattimore said the entire field
of Truman' a program should be thought of in terms of alliance,
rather than control, since its aim was to draw away underdevel-
oped countries from Russia. Dr. Alan Valentine, President of
the University of Rochester, warned that, unless Point Four soon
became a working reality, it would become a major failure in our
diplomacy. He said:
The proposal raised excessive hopes in eager but un-developed minds. Their concepts of their need and of
the endless riches of America inflated their expecta-
tions; their economic ignorance gave them no realistic
understanding of the slowness and difficulties of eco-
nomic progress. Impatience and disappointment has led
toward disillusion and cynicism about American prom-
ises. *
Vyaya Laksahmi Pandit, India'3 Ambassador to the United
States, told the 174th Dinner Meeting of the Economic Club of New
York that the threat to world peace lay in the underdeveloped
countries with their teeming populations of underdeveloped peo-
ples. The lion's share of solving this problem lay with America,
projected as she had been into the position of leadership, and
with her great material wealth and scientific knowledge she could
offer workable solutions. She said that India was not seeking
gifts; that the nation had the resources to pay for what she
needed, and that it was "only the time and method of payment that
is required." 55
A Republican-sponsored move to out 600 million from the
53 New York Times
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third Marshall Plan authorization and to postpone the start of
Point Pour gathered momentum in the wake of an Administration
appeal for nonpartisan support of foreign-aid legislation. Sen-
ator Eugene D. Millikin (R-Col.) said that he mould sponsor with
Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.) an amendment striking out
the 45 million dollars for beginning Point Pour. Millikin said
it was the purpose of his amendment to substitute a provision
for a bi-partisan commission to study the program and report back
to the Senate before termination of the Marshall Plan in 1952.
Both sponsors of the postponement amendment made the point that
the Government was without adequate information on which to base
a long-range program of technical assistance, and that such a pol-
icy should not be undertaken until an investigation had been made.
Senator Homer Ferguson (R-I/iich.) suggested that the proposed study
include findings on the "climate" for private investments abroad.
He was joined in this by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R-Mass.).
This amendment was rejected by the Senate on Kay 5.
Senator Wherry (R-Nebr.) told the Senate that he thought it
was ridiculous to imagine that the United States would raise the
standards of living in the backward countries without the expend-
iture of billions upon billions of dollars. He said:
What I deplore most in the promotion of Point Pour
as a national policy is that it is assumed we have not
already put millions of dollars into underdeveloped
areas of the world. We are told because the ECA con-
centrates its efforts, in technical assistance for
western Europe, we must add a coordinated program to
take care of the rest of the world. .. .Ho thing could be
further from the truth. 56
5SCongressional Record , 81st Congress, 2nd Session, p. 6351.
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Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) said that this nation was whol-
ly incapable of improving the standards of living of people of
India and China, and that we were already spending more than six
billion dollars we were able to obtain in taxes. This new pro-
gram seemed to Taft to be inconsistent with practically every-
thing that the best thought in the United States had advocated.
This is merely a kind of tag end, anyway to the
other idea. The other idea was that we should spread
money all over the world actually to bring about im-
provements in underdeveloped countries and help them
develop their economy. That has been dropped out.
That is not popular enough. Instead of that, we are
going to take the tag end of that program and hand out
money for relief, for health, for education, and for
all sorts of purposes and things, and particularly ad-
vice, which we think we are so well capable of giving —
and we are not .
5
"
On May 5, 1950, the Senate sustained by a vote of 37 to 36
S. 3304, the Senate's omnibus foreign aid bill. However, the Sen-
ate insisted upon its amendments and requested a conference with
the House of Representatives.
The United States Chamber of Commerce plugged for the House
of Representatives version of Truman's Point Four program. In a
letter to the House and Senate conferees, who were attempting to
write a compromise three-billion dollar foreign aid bill, the
Chamber said that provisions in the House measure should be adopt-
ed because they would:
(1) Permit American capital and technology to r.ake
maximum contributions to development of backward areas.
(2) Make governments seeking aid responsible for
providing favorable investment conditions, and call on
them for adequate contributions of their own.
57 Congressional Record
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(3) Provide an advisory board to give guidance
in aid programs. 5^
The House and Senate conferees reached agreement on a
$3,121,450,000 foreign aid authorization bill May 15 after a
week of wrangling over its provisions. The measure ma now to
go to the House for approval. In the conference report there
was no guarantee or any private investments. Instead, provisions
to create a climate, by bi-lateral agreements with countries to
which our investors would want to go, was set u-o.
Capus M. Waynick, Ambassador to Nicaragua and former North
Carolina editor and publisher, was named by the State Department
on Kay 17 to direct the first stages of the Point Pour program.
James E. Webb, Acting Secretary of State, said the ambassador
would assume the direction of Point Four on a temporary basis,
indicating that a permanent director would be named when the pro-
gram actually got underway.
Linking by the United States of the Point Pour program to
aid undeveloped areas with the program for increasing exports of
European nations was suggested by Cesare Merzagore, a member of
the Italian Senate and former Minister for Foreign Trade. Sena-
tor Merzagore said the tie-in of the two efforts would have the
double advantage of helping the undeveloped areas of the world
and help Europe advance further on the road to industrial recov-
ery. Textiles and other merchandise could be financed, he in-
dicated, in what he termed "off-shore procurement for Point
CO
New York Times
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Pour." 59
On Kay 23, shortly after the prompt approval by the House
vote of 247 to 88, the supposed final draft of the $3,120,550,000
authorization ran into unexpected trouble in the Senate. Trouble
arose over changes made by Senate and House conferees in the
Point Four phase of the program. Some, but not all, Republicans
of the Senate saw in the conference changes a "determined" plan
to expand aid by mere techniques into one. sought also to encour-
age investment of American capital abroad, with implied guaran-
tees against financial loss.
Senator Robert A. Taft (R-Ohio) arose as Senator Tom Con-
nally offered the conference report and observed casually that
differences seemed to have been \vorked out and that the Senate,
no doubt, was ready to give immediate approval. "I wish to give
notice," Senator Taft shouted,
that I intend to take a major effort to have the
report rejected because of the substantial change and
additions to Point Pour program. It seems to me that
we have here an absolutely new bill, one which should
be debated at length. 60
The fight was now on. Seldom, it was conceded by observers, had
a debate generated so much heat so rapidly.
There was no proposal for a guarantee of profits to an in-
vestor abroad, Senator Connally asserted. The only guarantees,
he insisted, were against the actions of "road agents." On the
59 New York Times , May 18, 1950, 5:5.
60 I&id'» Ma7 24 » 1950, 1:2.
61 Loc. cit.
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House side, as the debate was going on, the Rules Committee re-
fused, by a vote of five to four, to release for floor consider-
ation a separate measure which would guarantee up to 250 million
dollars in investments made abroad under Point Pour. Pear was
expressed, it was reported, that such guarantees would put cheap
foreign labor into serious competition with the product of Amer-
ican labor.
Senator George W. Kalone (R-lIev.) holding, the floor for
three and one-half hours, contended that the Point Four urogram,
as drafted in the Senate-House conference, would give major eco-
nomic assistance even to Communist-dominated countries. He was
supported by Republicans, including Robert A. Taft of Ohio, min-
ority policy leader. Senator Kalone also said:
Now we come to the truth for the first time, namely,
that the desire is to spread the markets and the re-
sources of the United States across the entire world —
to average the living standards of the nations of the
world — and, in fact, to have "one economic world."
I would like to say.... that we are now apparently
starting to tell the American people the truth. The
only thing about which they haven't been told the truth
is that it is a permanent program and was intended from
the beginning to be so. As we should have realized
when, just before the ECA program was adoDted, we had
given $3,750,000,000 to England alone, and it was "gone
with the wind." Before that we had TOJRRA. Before that
we had lend-lease with everything written off. One
thing leads to another. It is all^one program — a
dangerous and continuous pattern.
^
Halone also brought out the fact that, as soon as Point Pour was
agreed to, there no doubt would be a great propaganda machine set
up to start to convince the taxpayers and the Members of Congress
go
congressional Record
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that appropriations should be Increased by next year, if not be-
fore.
Senator William E. Jenner (R-Ind.) held that the program
was, in fact, a program sought eagerly by the Soviet Union in a
plot to bleed America to death economically. He named Sari Brow-
der as the "Communist architect and advocate" of Point Pour, and
said Moscow intended to profit by it as it would "finance revol-
utionary movements" against "exploitations by Western imperial
powers." 63 Thus, Jenner told the Senate, Point Pour "fitted into
the Communist blueprint for the destruction of the Western world,"
and, further, it had a part in "the tragic collapse of America's
interest in China." 64
The Republicans, under Senator Taft's leadership, sought to
send the whole measure back to conference with instructions for
a strict confining of the Point Four program to technical assist-
ance and with the alleged promotion of investment capital omitted
entirely. Senator Alexander Wiley (R-Wis.) said that it was ar-
gued that the bill would permit the President to extend assist-
ance to the iron-curtain countries. He believed that that was a
fallacious argument, for there was no intention whatsoever on the
part of the executive branch to extend technical assistance to
the iron-curtain countries. He said:
Moreover, the President is instructed under Sec.
411 (a) of the bill to terminate any such program if
Congressional Record
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it is not consistent with the foreign nolicy of the
United States. Obviously, technical aid to' iron-cur-
tain countries would not be consistent with our for-
eign policies.
It is argued that the bill is a blank check to
the President, who may extend aid in any way he sees
fit.... (However), Sec. 407 (c), for example, lays down
five specific limitations on the granting of technical
assistance. bi-1
Roll call on the Conference Report in the Senate showed 47
yeas, 27 nays, and 22 not voting. Thus, the Senate passed the
foreign aid bill, and it was sent to the President for his signa-
ture. While Point Pour might solve no problems alone, it did
help to achieve all the traditional foreign objectives of United
States policy. It contributed to the effectiveness of Point One
(support of the United Nations), Point Two (economic recovery),
and Point Three (defense arrangements) and was, in turn, strength-
ened by them. It was to play an integral element in a many-sided
foreign policy.
On June 5, 1950, President Truman signed the bill that auth-
orized $3,200,000,000 for five foreign aid provisions. He de-
clared that it was "a memorable step forward in our program for
peace." Truman paid tribute to the "forward-looking members of
the Congress of both political parties" who had supported the
measure through some sharp debate in sustaining the bi-partisan
foreign policy. He called the bill a "typically American enter-
prise in the effort to build a peaceful and prosperous world."66
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THE ROLE OP THE STATE DEPARTMENT
IN THE PASSAGE OP POINT POUR
During the sessions of the Slst Congress, the State Depart-
ment was playing a role and was making plans to implement Point
Pour. President Truman's inaugural address had produced an elec-
tric effect around the globe. It was at the same time a chal-
lenge and a promise. Not a promise of what the United States
could do for the world, but a promise of what all freedom-loving
people, working together, could accomplish for themselves. To
Secretary of State Ache son the essential thing about the program
was:
. the use of material means to nonmaterial end.
It is not that we believe that other people need or wish
things for their own purpose merely to have these ma-
terial objects. It is not that material objects in and
of themselves make a better or fuller life; but they are
the means by which people can obtain freedom, not only
freedom from the pressure of those other human beincrs who
would restrict their freedom, but help in the ancient
struggle of man to earn his living and get his bread from
the soil. That is the purpose; that is the objective of
this program.
The Department of State had been aware of an increasing mani-
festation by peoples all over the world of their desire to im-
prove their economic conditions by the use of more technical know-
ledge. The Economic Corporation Administration had increasingly
found lack of technical competence a bottleneck to economic re-
habilitation. The State Department provided policy guidance for
Dean Acheson, "Point Pour Program for World Economic
Progress, United States Department of State Bulletin Febru-
ary 6, 1949, 20TT551 -'
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two major programs of "oi-lateral technical assistance, although
they v;ere operating within limited budgets. The Institute of
Inter-American Affairs, a government corporation, worked cooper-
atively with Latin-American countries in agriculture, health and
sanitation, and education. The Inter-departmental Committee on
Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (SCO), composed of other gov-
ernment agencies, carried on cooperative technical assistance
projects in the basic social and economic fields of government
administration. In addition, the Department of State adminis-
tered the Philippine Rehabilitation Program, and the Army con-
ducted technical assistance programs in occupied areas. The Eco-
nomic Cooperation Administration regarded the technical assistance
provision of the legislation as of key importance since a few
thousand dollars spent in channeling technical "know-how" to the
areas in ERP countries, where assistance had been needed, possi-
bly would have the effect of increasing vastly the recovery ef-
fect of millions of dollars spent for commodities.
Early in 1949, the President asked the Secretary of State to
confer with other agencies in outlining an approach to the pro-
gram. Within the State Department the work was handled by As-
sistant Secretary Willard L. Thorp. The first general interde-
partmental consultations were held by the Executive Committee on
Economic Foreign Policy, augmented by representatives of all ad-
ditional agencies with a major interest in the program. An inter-
departmental steering committee of eight agencies and departments
was set up, under Thorp's chairmanship, to work on the develop-
ment of the program.
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The International Trade Organization Charter recognized the
far-reaching importance of improving the underdeveloped coun-
tries. The Charter established the principle that the developed
countries should cooperate to make available capital, equipment,
and technical know-how to the underdeveloped countries who, on
their part, should assure just and equitable treatment for what
they receive. The solution of some of the foreign trade problems
of Europe lay in plans for the underdeveloped areas of the world.
The course of their economic development would affect their capa-
city to absorb European goods in and to supply products that
Europe was obliged to buy from the dollar area. Members would
determine the terms upon which they would receive or allow such
investment in their territories, but they obligated themselves to
give "adequate security for existing and future investments ."2
The President, in a special message on February 21, 1949,
asked the Congress to extend the life of the Institute of Inter-
American Affairs and also to authorize an expansion of its coop-
erative programs in public health, sanitation, education, and ag-
riculture throughout. This request was based on the fact that
the 1947 Act which created it would expire at the close of the
fiscal year 1950. At this time the IIAA was chartered by Cong-
ress as a wholly government-owned corporation. However, the IIAA
programs had been in effect since 1942 under supervision of pre-
decessor agencies of the Institute. Unless the new legislation
2 Horman Burns, "The American Farmer and the International
Trade Organization," United States Department of State Bulletin,
February 20, 1949, 207218.
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was approved by Congress, the Institute would have to liquidate
its affairs, beginning in July, 1950.
In referring to a country as economically underdeveloped,
the State Department did not mean to reflect on it in any unfa-
vorable way. A number of countries v/ith rich cultural heri-
tages, and which ranked high in the community of civilized na-
tions, badly needed to bring their resources and skills of their
people to higher levels of economic productivity. According to
John R. Steelman, Assistant to the President, 3 Point Four was not
a recovery program or a reconstruction program; but a development
program, and to that extent a creative enterprise. Its purpose
was not to restore living standards but to raise them where they
were below the traditional levels enjoyed in many other parts of
the world. He said that this was a logical forward step in the
United States program of international cooperation. What had
been the scattered activities of business and government were to
be brought together and made a major part of the United States
foreign policy.
Economic development could not be given to, nor could it be
imposed upon, a country by international cooperation. But there
were practical forms of international cooperation which could fa-
cilitate the process. This was the realistic approach of Presi-
dent Truman in his inaugural address. According to his concept,
economic development meant the continuous improvement and utili-
"Goals and Practical Problems of the Point Pour Program "
United State s Department of State Bulletin, June 12. 1949 '
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zation of the resources and productive capacities of a people for
the benefit of the people. This applied to farms as well as fac-
tories, to intellectual advancement as well as physical health.
It also applied to habits of work and habits of leisure, to the
saving of capital, and to its provident investment. 4
Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs,
said that American policy did not countenance use of capital in-
vestment abroad for the purpose of exploitation. In this era,
there have appeared to be many barriers to the flow of consider-
able quantities of private capital. The suggestion made by the
President was that some way be found whereby sufficient assur-
ances be given so the existing obstacles would be removed.
The process of technical cooperation and interchange took
place in the past along many channels and through many tyoes of
institutions. Immigrants had carried skills .from one area to an-
other. Private enterprises had operated in other countires. En-
gineers and advisors had been employed abroad. Great humanitar-
ian enterprises like the Rockefeller Foundation had carried know-
ledge to many areas. Professional persons had travelled widely,
and technical publications had distributed internationally the
results of individual scientific discovery. According to Thorp
many of the above channels could be further developed and expand-
ed. He said that, so far as the United States was concerned,
every typo of toohnical cooperation 3hould be encouraged. For,
Wlllard L. Thorp, "Meeting of Economic and Social Council,"
United Stat i Department of- State Bulletin
.
March 6, 1949, 20:383.
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he stated:
Here is a field in which genuine international co-
operation can expand and flourish. No country has a
monopoly of skills, knowledge, or available oersonnel.
Certainly the United States has no such monoooly. The
amount of technical assistance will begin to approximate
the need only if all contribute to the joint effort....
5
There is no certain instant whan a policy comes into being.
It evolves. All policies have backgrounds of shorter or longer
periods of time, and they have contributed to then a great many
factors and a great many influences. Point Pour was indeed both
new and bold, if only by virtue of the vast scope that it em-
braced. In its principle elements, however, its prototype could
be found in the technical and scientific programs of cooperation,
which the United States had been conducting with Latin America for
many years. According to Wilfred Kalenbaun, Chief, Division of
Investment and Economic Development:
Our whole policy aim at reducing the possibili-
ties of war and the ultranationalistic tendencies which
are both a cause and a result of the uncertainties inthe present world situation. More specifically ourpostwar program will make further strides toward
eliminating the distorted world oroduction and tradepicture, which is at the root of the balance-of-pay-
ments problem. Progress here, however hopeful, can
only be slow. 6
In order to make Point Pour a functional program, the first
step in many areas would undoubtedly be to conduct an expert sur-
vey in the various fields that were basic to economic develop-
tt^J
Y
HllardJ" T'"orp > "feting of Economic and Social Council,"Jnited g uaLe s Department of State Bulletin
. March 6, 1949, 20:287.
.. .
"America's Sole in Economic Development Abroad." UnitedSta^s Department of State Bulletin
, March 27, 1949, 20:374:
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ment; such as transportation, health, education, communications,
and water resources. Only by surveying from the ground up could
future programs be integrated into a practical program.
America's role in the economic development abroad sounded
expensive, but Malenbaum showed that the very nature of the eco-
nomic development process would aid the United States. He said
that the state of the world's use of its resources, especially
in the areas least well-developed, was such that tremendous pro-
gress could be made in this direction alone. Without additional
significant amounts of capital investment, better technical meth-
ods in themselves could contribute to the efficiency with which
existing human and other resources were utilized. Malenbaum
brought out the fact that the program, as in the past, would be
cooperative in the sense that the recipient countries would be
multi-lateral, with other countries contributing the skills. He
said that this was essential not only because the United States
did not have a monopoly on technical competence, but also because
they did not have an unlimited resource of skilled personnel.'7
On the investment side, Malenbaum stated that the role of
the private investor should be increased. He said that it was
the venturesomeness of risk capital, a field in which private
American enterprise had demonstrated unparalleled capacities,
that might be a decisive factor in the economic development of
foreign areas. 8 Under Secretary of State Webb said that the
"America's Role in Economic Development Abroad," United
States Department of State Bulletin
, March 27, 1949, 20:371-3.
~
^ Ibid.
, p. 373.
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greater part of the United States industrial technology had been
developed by private organizations.
John Steelman believed that there were two difficulties that
had to be overcome before private investment could make its max-
imum contribution to the Point Pour program. Both concerned the
"climate" for investments. Private enterprise had to be assured
that its Investments anywhere would receive equal treatment with
any other investments in the country. Secondly, it was equally
necessary that the countries be assured that the imported capital
would improve their standard of living and would not exploit their
people, destroy their resources, or impair their independence or
political integrity. Steelman added that it would also be neces-
sary to deal with the problem of convertibility into dollars of
the returns from foreign investment, for in this period many
countries were unable to earn even the dollars they needed to pay
for the most necessary imports.
^
George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs,
said that there was obviously both selfishness and altruism in
President Truman's proposal.
It was selfish because the United States does its
greatest trade with the countries that are economically
prosperous. It was selfish because an economy of pri-
vate enterprise can remain most healthy in a world-wide
expanding economy. It was selfish because the peace of
the world and the security of the United States depends
upon the well-being of the underdeveloped nations.
On the other hand, this plan was altruistic be-
cause the United States was not seeking any political
9 "Goals and Practical Problems of the Point Pour Program,"
United States Department of State Bulletin
.
June 12, 1949, 20:762.
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favors. It was asking no privileges for American bus-
iness greater than those accorded to businessmen from
any other country. And the United States was willing
to contribute more than its. proportionate share in
this program. 10
10
"Where Do We Stand on Point Pour," Department of State Bul-
letin, July 4, 1949, 21:865.
"."A Task for Generations," Strengthening the Forces of Free -
dom
,
(Department of State Publication) , 19b0, p. 66.
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"The Point Four Program - Catalyst of the Future," United
States Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1950, 22:214.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson said that the 35 million dol-
lars being requested for increased technical assistance for the
first year was a modest beginning. This sum was a small fraction
of the sums being expended in other necessary foreign aid pro-
grams. Yet, he went on to say, because of the nature of the
Point Four program, this expenditure could be expected to yield
results far out of proportion to its size. The sum could not be
larger because the number of technical specialists was limited.
Assistant Secretary Thorp said that there would be many delays
found in the expanding of the supervisory staff, in negotiating
agreements with governments, in recruiting the necessary experts,
and in organizing the necessary training facilities. Acheson al-
so emphasized that this program was not a short-term one and that
"we must recognize that we are entering upon a task that will re-
quire generations to fulfill the great promise it holds."
Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary for Economic Affairs, in a speech that he delivered to
the League of Women Voters, 2 said that the United States consid-
ered as economically underdeveloped most of Latin America, Africa,
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and Asia. In his speech he outlined what he believed to be the
characteristics of the Point Four program. First, Point Pour in-
volved the application of two vital forces, modern technology and
capital, to the existing manpower and natural resources of the
have-not areas. Second, the program was mainly one of self-help
by the people themselves of the under-developed areas. They must
plan, organize, and finance most of their own developments. Third,
this program must by its nature be international in scope. No
country could possibly carry single-handed the effort necessary
to speed up the development of two-thirds of the world's people.
The fourth characteristic set forth by Hayes was that this
program was not solely or even predominately a governmental pro-
gram. True, he went on to state, governments would provide funds
for a great expansion in international technical cooperation. But
most of those funds would be spent through private agencies, un-
der special contracts. Also on the capital investment side, a
great emphasis would be placed on private enterprise, with the
government as facilitator and cooperator.
Fifth, this was a long-range program. It promised no sudden
miracles. According to Hayes, the reasons for this were not al-
ways understood, and unfavorable comparisons were made with the
billions appropriated for ERP and with the large percentage gains
in production planned and achieved in Western Europe.
The situation is, of course, very different in un-
derdeveloped areas from what it is in Europe. In Eur-
ope the preconditions of economic recovery were, in
1947, already present. The people were healthy, enter-
prising, literate, and skilled....
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Before capital and modern technology can be
fully utilized in an underdeveloped area, there is
usually a lot of groundwork to be done. The people
in that area must be ready to receive technical know-
ledge and to make efficient use of capital, and the
early states of economic development in many areas
must, therefore, be concerned with improvements in
basic education, health, and sanitation, and food
supply. 13
Sixth, so far as the United States was concerned, this was
to be a relatively low-cost program.
In examining the relation of Point Four to the whole United
States policy in the light of our broad policies, Hayes said that,
traditionally, our national objectives have been personal freedom,
peace, and prosperity. Our foreign policies have furthered in a
practical way those objectives. In order to strengthen at home
those conditions, Hayes continued, the United States must do what
it could to strengthen those conditions everywhere. He said that
we could no longer afford merely a passive interest, for we were
a major nation in the full stream of world affairs. He then went
on to say:
We cannot, except for the short run, entrust our
security even to a possible preponderance of power.
We cannot confine ourselves to dealing with symptoms.
We must go much deeper and try to root out the germ
causes of mankind's chronic ailments. We must seek a
more permanent kind of peace by removing the bases of
conflict among men. We must help build a world soci-
ety in which every man has a real personal stake in
peace. Then, if tyrants and governments try to dis-
turb the peace, they will staff against the abrasive
antagonism of the great masses of peoples.
"
13
"The Point Pour Program - Catalyst of the Future," United
States Department of State Bulletin , February 6, 1950, 22:2157^
l4 Loc. cit.
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In late February, 1950, the State Department sent a special
mission to Southeast Asia to prepare the way for the most ex-
peditious and efficient use of whatever technical assistance
funds would become available for that area. The mission was
headed by R. Allan Griffin, publisher of the Monterey (Californ-
ia) Peninsula Herald . The mission was to visit Saigon, Singa-
pore, Rangoon, Bangkok, and Djakarta. He was accompanied by a
small group of experts and by Samuel Hayes, Jr., and William Mc-
Afee, who was area specialist in the Bureau of Far Eastern Af-
fairs.
The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development
was established by the Department of State, February 21, 1950.
The Interim Office was assigned general responsibility within the
Department for securing effective administration of programs in-
volving technical assistance to economically underdeveloped areas
and directing the planning in preparation for the Point Four pro-
gram. In carrying out these responsibilities the Interim Office
would rely upon the regional bureaus, Bureau of United Nations
Affairs, and other components of the Economic Affairs area for
participation in the technical assistance programs.
On March 30, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson appeared
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 15 He spoke to
them on the legislation, "The Act for International Development."
Acheson said that this legislation was the product of more than
"Point Four Legislation," Strengthening: the Forces of
Freedom
,
(Department of State Publication), 1'9507^.-S8^
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a year of careful study, in which 43 agencies of the Federal
Government had participated. It was also the product of consult-
ation with interested members of Congress and with leading mem-
bers of business, labor, and scientific groups. According to
Acheson, the legislation did two things. First, it established
the objectives and the broad policy to guide the whole program
of American aid to underdeveloped areas, and, second, it auth-
orized the President to carry out that part of the program deal-
ing with technical cooperation.
The legislation before the Senate Committee was a security
measure and, a3 such, it was an essential arm of the United States
foreign policy, so said Acheson. He went on to say that the
United States foreign policy was not based on security alone. It
was based on the assumption that, in the world today, our own
welfare was closely related to that of other peoples. With this
being the case, the United States could participate in this kind
of program because it served both the interest of other peoples
and our own interest. The bill before the Committee established
economic development for the first time as a national policy.
^
Acheson reemphasized once again the fact that the people of
the underdeveloped countries must have confidence that foreign
investors viould not squander their natural resources, would pay
taxes, obey local laws, and provide decent wages and working con-
ditions. On the other hand, the investors must have confidence
16
"Point Four Legislation," Strengthening the Forces of
Freedom
,
(Department of State Publication), 1950, p. 68-69.
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that their property would not be confiscated without fair com-
pensation, that they could take their legitimate profits and
their capital out of the country, and that they could have rea-
sonable freedom to manage their business subject to local laws
.
that would apply to everybody equally. He believed that the
United States could go ahead with the program while it was try-
ing to develop a "favorable climate" for investment. To him, one
of the best ways for developing this climate was to get on just
as energetically as possible with technical cooperation. 17
That there were obvious advantages in giving support to the
work of the United Nations in the field of technical assistance
was one of Acheson's strongest convictions. He said that any-
thing that gave that organization greater authority and experi-
ence was good for them and for us. Also, the United Nations and
related agencies were set up to do certain things that the United
States could not do. For example, they could mobilize the re-
sources of many countries, and moreover they were closer to the
problems of the underdeveloped peoples and, therefore, had a bet-
ter understanding of the basic needs of the people. He added
that the United States should have no fear of contributing to the
United Nations' technical programs since it was well represented
in that organization. 18
Acheson believed that one of the greatest needs in the un-
derdeveloped areas was to train people in the simple basic prac-
17 Point Pour Legislation, " Strengthening the Forces ofFreedom
,
(Department of State Publication), 19507~p.~159";
18 Ibid
. , pp. 70-71.
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tioes of public administration. In this field, he said, we could
help people in such things as techniques of census-taking and
keeping vital statistics. Here he stated that investment capi-
tal was not needed. What was needed was some skilled people,
people who could literally talk the language of the country they
were working with. 19
By its very nature, Acheson said, this was not and never
would he a big-money enterprise. It was a cooperative program,
which meant that a considerable part of the expense would be
borne by the countries with which the United States would work.
Its objective was to show other people how to meet their own
needs, not to attempt to meet those needs ourselves. Even though
this program must be on a long-term basis, we would not have to
wait long to get results. Some results would be seen in a year,
but others would take five or ten years or even longer to pro-
duce tangible benefits. For further emphasis, Acheson brought
out the fact that ten years was a minute in the life of a nation
and less than a second in the life of a civilization. Also, the
fight for freedom and democracy had been going on for more than
Oft
two thousand years, and it now would not be won in a decade. u
Speaking for the State Department, Acheson stated:
Here, indeed, is a chance to prove that our civi-
lization, which has grown to vigor and maturity with
the help of science, can bend science to its will --
not to destroy but to serve humanity.
^
19
"Point Pour Legislation," Strengthening the Forces of
Freedom
,
(Department of State Publication), 1950, p. 72.
20 Ibid
., p. 73.
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POINT FOUR
With the passage of the Act for International Development
in June, 1950, the Congress of the United States for the first
time authorized programs of technical assistance to underdevel-
oped countries on a global scale. In that act it was declared to
be:
....the policy of the United States to aid the ef-
forts of the people of economically underdeveloped areas
to develop their resources and improve their working and
living conditions by encouraging the exchange of tech-
nical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment
capital to countries which provide conditions under which
such technical assistance and capital can effectively and
constructively contribute to raising standards of living,
creating new sources of wealth, increasing productivity,
and expanding purchasing power.
1
During the first year of operation, action under the act had
been mainly preparatory and administrative. The Technical Cooper-
ation Administration had been assigned to the Department of State
by Executive Order 10159 of September 8, 1950, » and was estab-
lished effective by the State Departmental Announcement 212 of
October 27, 1950. 3 On December 7, 1950, the Senate confirmed the
nomination of Henry G. Bennett as Technical Cooperation Adminis-
trator, and also confirmed the nomination of Nelson A. Rockefel-
ler as Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board.
Although the State Department had hoped to have $45,000,000
to finance the first year of the program, it was not unduly dis-
1 See Appendix C.
2 "Administration for the Act for International Development,"
United States Department of State Bulletin
, 23:499.
» "Establishment of Technical Cooperation Administration,"
United States Department of State Bulletin
, 23:793.
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appointed with the $35,500,000 granted by the Appropriations Act
signed September 6, 1950. Of this total, $2,600,000 appropri-
ated for International Information and Educational Activities
was utilized to finance technical assistant projects already un-
derway, while $5,000,000 was turned over to the Institute of In-
ter-American Affairs to carry out its activities frequently re-
ferred to as a "preview of Point Pour." Out of the remaining
$26,900,000, the United States contributed $12,007,500 to the
United Nations technical assistance program. After several other
minor deductions were made, about ten million dollars was left
out of the first year's appropriation to be apportioned among
participating countries for new projects. 4
From the first, the Point Pour program was forced to labor
under the severe handicap of public misunderstanding. The con-
cept was originally presented in such glowing terms that it was
easy to overlook the fact that it was essentially a long-term
policy of guided self-help. In the underdeveloped areas, Point
Four was considered to be a sort of super "give-away" or "hit-
the-jackpot" affair, and when the meaning of technical assistance
did percolate down to the expected participants, their first ac-
tion was one of dismay. Prime Minister Wehru of India considered
the program of "no great value," and M, A. H. Ispahanl, Pakis-
tani Ambassador to the United States, termed it financially in-
adequate. 5
4 Howard C. Gary, "Point Four Gets Off to Successful Start,"
Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
January 12, 1951, 30:2-3.
° Ibid.
, p. 3.
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While the United Nations program of technical assistance
was making slow but steady progress, the United States had pro-
ceeded to make a number of bi-lateral agreements designed to im-
plement Point Pour. These negotiations had led to a clearer un-
derstanding of the plan as well as to a friendlier attitude on the
part of prospective recipients.
On October 19, 1950, the first comprehensive and integrated
project under the program was agreed upon by the United States
and Iran, 6 which involved an allocation of five hundred thousand
dollars to help improve conditions in rural Iran. Under the pro-
ject, villagers were to be taught elementary sanitation, agricul-
tural, and vocational techniques in centrally located demonstra-
tion centers. It was hoped that this mass education would, for
example, reduce the number (about four million) who fall victim
to malaria every year. During the last week in October the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the Egyptian government7 approved that coun-
try' s participation in the Point Pour program, and directed its
foreign minister to discuss details of a specific agreement with
State Department officials. The Egyptian government had the mat-
ter under advisement for several months, and agreed to partici-
pate only when convinced that there were no political strings tied
to the program.
"Point Pour Project in Iran Announced," United States De -
partment of State Bulletin , 23:703.
7 Howard C. Gary, "Point Pour Gets Off to Successful Start,"
Foreign Policy Bulletin , January 12, 1951, 30:3.
103
On November 7, a general or "umbrella" 8 agreement was
signed with Ceylon. 9 Unlike the Iranian arrangement, it did not
involve a grant of funds. Rather, the arrangement specified cer-
tain lines of technical cooperation, including specific projects,
as well as a statement of the conditions that had to be met in
order to qualify that island to receive Point Pour funds. On
November 18, Oscar Meier, chief of the United States economic
mission to Liberia, said that the progress made in that small,
independent African republic was "a striking illustration of what
can be done with technical assistance toward the development of
economic and human resources." 10 The allocation to that country
was 850 thousand dollars to finance the activities of 67 American
technicians working in the fields of health, agriculture, power,
transport and public administration.
On December 2, the United States and Paraguay announced the
formation of the first joint commission for economic develop-
ment. 11 This body was to survey the needs of the Paraguayan
economy and make recommendations as to the specific projects
which would be financed with a Point Pour allocation. During the
week of December 18, Point Pour pacts were signed with Haiti and
Brazil. The latter document was especially interesting because
8 Supra, 114.
9 "General Technical Cooperation Agreement with Ceylon
Signed," United States Department of State Bulletin
, S3: 975.
10 Howard C. Gary, "Point Pour Gets Off to Successful Start,"
Foreign Policy Bulletin
, January 12, 1951, 30:3.
Point Four Program in Paraguay," United States Department
of State Bulletin
, 23:974.
™ Howard C. Gary, "Point Pour Gets Off to Successful Start "
Foreign Policy Bulletin
.
January 12, 1951, 30:3.
104
it included an "umbrella" agreement, similar to the one used in
Ceylon, plus the establishment of a joint committee for economic
assistance along the lines of the Paraguayan agreement. On De -
13camber 28, the State Department announced that a Point Four
compact had been signed with India. An allotment of one million
two hundred thousand dollars was to be provided to begin work on
five specific development projects. While this would meet India's
present emergency need for two million tons of grain, it could do
much to assure that a similar situation did not occur in future
years
.
In each case the recipient nation would provide approximate-
ly the dollar equivalent of- the Point Pour monies in goods and
services to be utilized in connection with local projects. It
was estimated, for example, that the Iranian contribution of ex-
perts, equipment, buildings, and land involved a, local outlay
valued at four dollars for every American dollar provided. It
was, therefore, clear that this country which, beginning with its
contribution to UNRRA, had advanced nearly 30 billion dollars in
foreign loans, grants, and other forms of aid, had not embarked
in Point Pour on a program of major financial commitments.
By mid-December, some 350 American technicians were already
at work in 36 foreign countries. These men and women were "giv-
ing the lie" to the Communist charge that this nation conducted
its international economic relations on a predatory or imperial-
«.
"^ 11°^J^" A§reeMent with India," United States Depart-ment of State Bulletin, 24:67. fcL^J:
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istic basis.
The act had scarcely been passed when the outbreak of war In
Korea changed the underlying economic problems. The Point Pour
program took on a new aspect. It could be used as a vehicle for
getting a larger production of raw materials and for maintaining
the friendship of underdeveloped countries in a critical period.
In addition, rising standards of living would tend to prevent the
spread of Communism in underdeveloped areas and would sustain the
authority of existing regimes.
The situation in the underdeveloped countries shifted. The
increased demand for raw materials made their prices shoot up-
ward, export trade boomed, and foreign exchange became available.
Temporarily, the underdeveloped countries had increased resources
at their disposal for working out programs of their own.
This new emphasis now being placed on preparing the free
world for defense had made it necessary to re-examine the origi-
nal premises. Two reports made to the President reappraised the
program in the light of the, increasing international tension.
One of these, the report made by Gordon Gray, former Secretary of
the Army, Special Assistant to the President, represented an at-
tempt to combine the immediate and long-run objectives of Ameri-
can assistance for economic development in a unified program.
Gray's report dealt mainly with what the United States must do
to help the rest of the non-Communist world make a living while
it was being rearmed. It recommended a world-wide version of ECA
to allocate and administer the billions of dollars the Job would
cost. "The overriding objective of our foreign policy is to es-
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tablish a just and lasting peace" was the opening sentence of the
report. 14 The report suggested that the United States had four
major functions to perform in this field:
(1) to increase the ability of underdeveloped coun-
tries to defend themselves;
(2) to secure the cooperation of these countries in
a mutual defense system;
(3) to increase their productive ability in order to
secure the mutual benefits of exchange for civilian and
defense use; and
(4) to promote the more effective immediate use of
the economic resources of the free world, while at the
same time helping all countries to make progress in eco-
nomic improvement on a self-supporting basis through in-
creasing international trade. 15
The Gray report, which was completed after the aggression in
Korea, emphasized that economic aid was as essential a pillar of
American foreign policy as military aid. Its answer to the post-
Korean scramble for raw materials was a program of international
collaboration whereby every effort would be made to expand the
output of critical items in short supnly, and of cooperative ac-
tion for "guiding supplies of scarce materials among the free na-
tions in the manner best calculated to contribute to the common
defense" and "to assure the delivery of raw materials required by
other countries for purposes that support broad United States in-
terests." 16
To increase international trade, the report said, "we (U. S.)
14
"Expensive Free World," Newsweek, November 20, 1950, 36:29.
15 The International Studies Group of the Brookings Institu-
tion, Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy - 1951-1952. Septem-
ber, lSSTTp. 135. c
16 Howard C. Gary, "Rockefeller Report Spells Out Point Four
Proposals," Foreign Policy Bulletin , April 13, 1951, 30:3.
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must make sure that our own house is in order, that we have elim-
inated necessary barriers to imports, and that our policies in
such fields as agriculture and shipping are so adjusted that they
do not impose undue burdens on world trade." Also the report
brought out that the United States should not help anybody who
would not help himself and demanded guarantees in advance of such
self-help. It also noted ruefully that "we must generally oper-
ate with and through existing governments, handicapped in some
cases by inexperience or other weaknesses...." And it went on to
say that Europe's business trouble was that it lacked "entrepre-
neurial initiative"—a fancy phrase for American get-up and go. 17
The second report, submitted to the President on March 7,
1951, by the International Development Advisory Board headed by
Nelson A. Rockefeller, represented an attempt to vitalize the
Point Pour program. The study entitled Partners in Progress
stressed the fact that "strengthening the economies of the under-
developed regions and an improvement in their living levels must
be considered a vital part in .our own defense mobilization." 18
The Rockefeller study stated that the military mobilization of
the democratic states placed a greater premium than ever on vi-
able economies. It tended, however, to stress even more the im-
mediate benefits that the United States would receive as a result
of increasing the productive capacity of the democratic states.
"Expensive Free World," Newsweek
. November 20, 1950, 36:30.
Howard C. Gary, "Rockefeller Report Spells Out Point Pour
Proposals," Foreign Policy Bulletin
, April 13, 1951, 30:3.
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The report made several specific proposals to help carry
out a program of aid to the underdeveloped areas. The first im-
perative would be to rebuild sufficient military strength to re-
sist aggression. A new unified agency, perhaps to be called the
United States Overseas Economic Administration, was suggested as
a device to overcome the duplication of effort arising from the
fact that, at the present time, 23 United States agencies had
foreign economic functions.
The Advisory Board recommended that the new body should first
of all press for a two billion dollar development program to ex-
pand raw material output -- this increased production to be ac-
complished under private auspices. This program, as well as all
other activities, should be carried out on a regional basis be-
cause the approach to each area must be geared to the particular
historical, social, cultural, and economic conditions peculiar to
that region. x The report recommended that the basic service pro-
jects be financed with the 500 million dollar appropriation sug-
gested for this purpose by the Gray report. " In order to assure
the fulfillment of essential public works projects, Partners in
Progress urged that, in addition to the Gray proposal, the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the American
Export-Import Bank lend a total of 600 to 800 million dollars an-
nually, and that an International Development Authority be estab-
19 Howard C. Gary, "Rockefeller Report Spells Out Point Four
Proposals," Foreign Policy Bulletin , April 13, 1951, 30:3.
20
"Expensive Free World," Newsweek , November 20, 1950, 36:30.
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lished with an initial capitalization of no more than 500 million
to finance a portion of the cost of projects which were import-
ant although not immediately profitable in a financial sense.
The new authority would work very closely with the International
Bank. The Advisory Board recommended that member quotas be pro-
portional to the quotas established for the International Bank
and that the United States contribution be set at 200 million dol-
lars. 2 -*-
In order to stimulate the flow of private American funds to
the underdeveloped regions, it was suggested that tax incentives
and bi-lateral treaties of commerce and friendship be utilized.
It was further suggested that a 100 million dollar fund from the
loan and guaranty authority of the Export-Import Bank be used to
underwrite the transfer risk on new foreign investment. In addi-
tion, every effort should be made to stimulate the mobilization
of local capital. For this purpose it was recommended that an
International Finance Corporation, to be affiliated with the In-
ternational Bank, be set up to make loans in local and foreign
currencies to private enterprises in the underdeveloped areas.
The United States subscription would amount to 150 million dol-
lars out of a total authorized capital of 400 million dollars.
This corporation would also be empowered to make nonvoting equity
investments and thus permitted new productive enterprises to
start operations without the burden of heavy fixed charges. The
international agency would not, of course, have to assume any re-
21
Howard G. Gary, "Rockefeller Report Spells Out Point Four
Proposals," Foreign Policy Bulletin , April 13, 1951, 30:3.
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sponsibility for management. 22
The Advisory Board expressed confidence that, if its recom-
mendations were carried out, the present one billion dollars an-
nual flow of private United States investment to foreign coun-
tries could be doubled. If this sum could be raised to
$2,500,000,000, it would be of inestimable value in strength-
ening the economies of the underdeveloped areas and would also
redound to the benefit of the United States and would represent
a total flow of funds equal to only one per cent of the national
income of this country. The merit of this report was that it
went into detail in regard to concrete proposals designed to im-
plement the concepts behind the Point Pour program. 23
In both reports, the emphasis was on a greatly enlarged pro-
gram that would be a vital instrument of American political and
economic policy. Both emphasized the dependence of the United
States on the underdeveloped areas. In the Gray report, the un-
derdeveloped areas were defined to include Latin America, Africa,
Turkey, Greece, Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Oce-
ania. These areas contained 45 per cent of the population of the
world. They had vast but underdeveloped resources, and approxi-
mately 73 per cent of the aggregate value of materials, imported
by the United States for stockpiling, came from them. Fifty-
eight per cent of all American imports came from these countries
22 Howard C. Gary, "Rockefeller Report Spells Out Point Pour
.s, Foreif"
Loc. cit.
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in 1950. Both reports emphasized the dependence of these areas
on trade with developed countries and on access to foreign cap-
ital.
The sequence of events since aggression broke out in Korea
had given renewed emphasis to all the problems associated with
programs of economic assistance to underdeveloped areas. The ex-
panding rearmament programs had thrown into relief the dependence
of North America and Europe on underdeveloped areas for supplies
of strategic materials such as natural rubber, tungsten, indus-
trial diamonds, chromite, and others. But this dependence dif-
fered only in degree from that which existed in more normal
times. The Western European countries had to look to those areas
not only for raw materials but also as export markets on v/hich
their recovery so largely depended. The economic and security
interests of the United States were likewise linked with these
areas. Apart from the present threat of Communist aggression,
stability in the underdeveloped areas was conceivable only if
economic and political improvements created a durable structure.
The interest of the free world lay in the offering of friendly
assistance for getting on with the fundamental task, and at the
same time in protecting countries unable to protect themselves
against immediate threats of aggression.
In his message to Congress (May, 1951) recommending adop-
tion of the mutual security program, President Truman stated that,
in addition to military and economic assistance to Europe, aid
was requested to continue technical assistance and to initiate
developmental programs elsewhere. This assistance was considered
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necessary not only from a humanitarian point of view but also
for reasons of national security. On October 10, 1951, the
United States incorporated the Point Pour program into the Mu-
tual Security Act. The Act's purpose was "to strengthen the mu-
tual security and individual and collective defenses of the free
world."" Further conditions were, however, attached. No coun-
try could receive aid unless the giving of assistance would
strengthen the security of the United States and unless the re-
cipient country agreed to join in promoting world peace and in
eliminating causes of international tension. On the economic
side, the act made special appropriations for the development of
sources of materials in which the United States was deficient.
It was also directed that the act should be administered in such
a way as to "provide incentives for a steadily increased parti-
cipation of free private enterprise in developing the resources
of foreign countries," to discourage "monopolistic business" in
countries receiving aid and, where suitable, to encourage "the
development of the free labor movements as the collective bargain-
ing agencies of labor within such countries."25 Finally, the act
required the withdrawal of aid, except under unusual circumstanc-
es, from any nation sending primary strategic materials to any
nation threatening the security of the United States, including
the Soviet Union and all countries under its domination.
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 provided for the coordina-
24
"Mutual Security Act of 1951," Public Law 165, 82nd Cong-
ress, 2nd Session.
25 Loc. clt.
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tion of all foreign aid programs under a Director for Mutual Se-
curity. The Technical Cooperation Administration remained an
agency of the Department of State, hut its operations were made
subject to the over-all supervision of the Director. The Act
also established a Mutual Security Agency to take the place of
the Economic Cooperation Administration, which went out of busi-
ness on December 31, 1951. In accordance with the policy of the
Director for Mutual Security that all economic programs in a
single country be administered by a single agency, technical co-
operation and other economic development programs in certain un-
derdeveloped areas, namely Greece, Southeast Asia, and the over-
seas territories of European countries, where the main responsi-
bility had been assigned to the Economic Cooperation Administra-
tion, were made the responsibility of the Mutual Security Agency.
The Technical Cooperation Administration was made responsible for
the programs in the American Republics, the independent countries
of Africa (Liberia, Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt), the
Near East (the Arab States, Iran, and Israel), and the South Asia
countries of Afghanistan, Ceylon, India, Nepal, and Pakistan.
The program in its new form did not work smoothly. 26 Many
countries were reluctant to accept the conditions laid down,
partly because they hoped to remain neutral in case of war, part-
ly because they were jealous of their sovereign rights. In view
of the violent gyrations in the prices of raw materials, many
26 The International Studies Group of the Brookings Institu-
tion, Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy - 1952-1953, Septem-
ber, 1952, p7 146. —i
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countries doubted the wisdom of allowing themselves to he devel-
oped mainly as primary producers. Colonies that hoped to achieve
freedom saw in the aid channeled to them through their governing
powers a method by which the latter could strengthen their hold
upon them. An atmosphere of distrust developed. In the United
States, the program also ran into difficulties. Private invest-
ment, which had been expected to provide some of the funds, was
deterred by the increasing financial and political instability
of the world and by a growing tendency in the underdeveloped
states to nationalize resources. Growing inflationary pressures
made expenditures of public funds more difficult. The "bold new
program" had run into interference. In spite of this, the Admin-
istration proposed in the spring of 1952 the continuation of the
27program as it had been set up in 1951.
The Point Pour program began to function under two kinds of
agreements. The general or "umbrella" agreements stated the
terms on which the host country and the Technical Cooperation Ad-
ministration would work. This was often used before further or-
ganization was determined. The second agreement was the program
agreement which specified the content and nature of the program,
budget, personnel, time allowed, and the objectives to be reached.
This was sometimes independent of any other arrangement. The Mu-
tual Security Act, after it was passed, also required that every
participating government agree to "join in promoting intemation-
**' The International Studies Group of the Brookings Institu-
tion, Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy - 1952-1955 , Septem-
ber, 1952, p. 146.
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al understanding and good will, in maintaining world peace, and
to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate
causes of international tension." By January, 1952, some 30 gov-
ernments had signed agreements incorporating this provision, and
negotiations were continuing with others.
Subject to the determination of the Director for Mutual Se-
curity, the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of October 31,
1951, made available up to $210,000,000 for Point Pour programs
in fiscal year 1952. Approximately 66 million dollars were ear-
marked for programs in South Asia. By February, 1952, 50 million
of this amount had been committed for cooperative programs in In-
dia and ten million for cooperative programs in Pakistan. Each
country was to match the Point Four contribution with an equal
amount of its own funds. Approximately $56,000,000 was earmarked
for programs in the Middle East, of which $23,450,000 were com-
mitted in January, 1952, for the program of Iran. Congress also
provided 50 million for a special program of relief and rehabili-
tation for Israeli refugees to be administered by the Technical
Cooperation Administration; 19 million for programs in Latin Amer-
ica; and up to 12 million for technical assistance programs of
the United Nations and up to one million for programs of the Or-
ganization of American States.
In most of the underdeveloped areas, the major problems grew
out of hunger, widespread disease, and illiteracy. Consequently,
the main effort of Point Pour operations in the field had been to
improve agriculture, health, and education. Approximately 80 per
cent of the budget was spent for projects in these fields in the
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fiscal year 1951, although cooperative projects were also under-
taken in the development of mineral and water resources, trans-
portation, communications, labor and industry, housing, and var-
ious phases of public administration.
The emphasis on agriculture, health, and education continued
in fiscal year 1952. And, with more funds available, it was
planned to help other countries expand certain kinds of facili-
ties which would contribute directly to the effectiveness of
technical cooperation and thereby speed economic progress; for
example, wells to support better farming in Iran and India, and
processing plants for agricultural products in Pakistan. Most of
the capital projects were to continue to be financed by private
or public capital, or by loans from private banks, governmental
institutions such as the Export-Import Bank, or the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
In 1952, what was popularly known as the Point Pour program
was two different but complementary American governmental activi-
ties. Point Pour proper was the Technical Cooperation Adminis-
tration, headed by Stanley Andrews from High Point, Missouri,
working under the State Department. TCA operated in areas more
or less remote from direct Russian threat. 28 In areas closer to
Soviet Russia the agency doing nearly identical work was the spe-
cial technical and economic missions of the Mutual Security Agen-
cy, known as STEM, an off- shoot of the Marshall Plan. This work
28
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.
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was headed by Dr. Clarence R. Decker, who was on leave from the
presidency of the University of Kansas City. 29
Both programs used the "pilot plant" theory, hoping that by
teaching the people of a backward area more advanced methods of
agriculture, public health, and education, a chain reaction would
be started. The pupils, it was planned, would in turn become
teachers of new pupils, so that the programs would spread in ever-
widening circles. Some tangible results have been achieved al-
ready. In one 100-square mile area in India, for. example, the
wheat yield was increased from 13 bushels per acre to 26 bushels
per acre as a result of using better seed, fertilizing the soil,
and Improving only slightly the primitive tools for tilling the
ground.
The corps of Point Four technicians in the field numbered
some 450 at the end of the fiscal year 1951. The field staff
grew steadily in fiscal year 1952 and, according to Stanley And-
rews ^w on June 7, 1952, there were 900 technicians from America
working in some 33 countries. Associated with these Americans
were between 15 and 20 thousand native technicians and workers.
American technicians going into the field were chosen not only
for technical competence, but also for character, personality,
and ability to work with the people of other countries. Before
leaving the United States, these technicians received training at
the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, as well as at the
29 St. Louis Post-Dispatch
, June 8, 1952, part 3, p. 1.
30 Loe. cit.
118
technical agency directing their work. Their training was de-
signed to give them an understanding of the customs and problems
of peoples with whom they were to work and an understanding of
Point Pour purposes and procedures. The United States paid the
salaries of the technicians and the cost of the equipment they
needed in their work.
While hundreds of American technicians were being sent a-
broad to assist and advise countries in solving some of their de-
velopment problems, it was only through trained, highly- skilled
people of their own that underdeveloped countries could expect
to carry out long-range programs and achieve economic stability.
Almost every Point Four field project involved the training of
foreign nationals on the spot. In addition, the Point Pour pro-
gram helped to bring foreign nationals to the United States for
advanced training in technical fields. Candidates for training
in the United States were carefully screened, and only those
found to be exceptionally qualified as to scholarship and train-
ability were accepted. Candidates accepted were chiefly gov-
ernment employees in their own countries who needed additional
training, or those who would have government positions waiting
for them when they returned home. As of January 1, 1952, some
350 nationals of foreign countries were taking advanced studies
in the United States under Point Pour grants, and several hundred
more grants were to be made during the fiscal year 1952. The
31
"Foreign Technicians Acquire Knowledge and Skills," Point
Four in Action . . .
.
Department of Interior' s Role , United States
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program also supported certain kinds of training programs in for-
eign areas. For example, under a Point Pour grant, the American
University of Beirut was training students for all the countries
of the Middle East in the basic fields: preventive medicine and
public health, agriculture and agricultural engineering, econom-
ics and finance, and public administration.
The Act for International Development called for the parti-
cipation of private agencies in the Point Pour program to the
greatest extent practicable. Up to January 1, 1952, over 50 con-
tracts had been signed with private American organizations, or
other agencies not a part of the United States government, for
specific Point Pour projects. Point Pour programs usually grew
out of requests for technical cooperation originating with for-
eign governments. These requests, taken separately, may be ran-
dom in nature. Therefore, the Technical Cooperation Administra-
tion had encouraged foreign governments to think in terms of
their major economic problems and made requests for programs
which fitted into their nation-wide development plan.
Various mechanisms had been developed to insure that Point
Pour activities contributed to economic progress and fitted into
country-wide development programs. In a number of countries —
Brazil, Paraguay, and Liberia, for example — Point Pour was
working through Joint Commissions dealing with nation-wide eco-
nomic development. These commissions were jointly financed,
jointly staffed, and jointly administered. In other countries,
the Point Pour was managed by a country director under the gen-
eral supervision of the United States Chief of Diplomatic Mission.
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The country director worked closely with the appropriate minis-
tries or agencies of the foreign government in planning and di-
recting technical cooperation programs.
In the most underdeveloped areas today, bi-lateral Point Pour
projects were going forward along with national development pro-
grams, regional development programs such as the British Common-
wealth's Colombo Plan for South and Southeast Asia, and multi-
lateral technical assistance programs of the United Nations.
The problem of coordinating Point Pour efforts with
other activities is one which requires continuing con-
sultation, review, and evaluation, both in Washington,
where the TCA maintains liaison with the United Nations
through the Department of State, and in the field. 32
On March 31, 1952, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs
completed its tenth year of cooperative technical assistance in
the basic economic fields of health and sanitation, agriculture,
and education, in cooperation with 18 Latin American countries.
This anniversary coincided with the decision of the Technical
Cooperation Administration of the Department of State to utilize
the pioneer experience of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.
It made the Institute its regional office for all technical as-
sistance programs in Latin America.
As part of the President's Point Pour program in its ex-
panded scope of operation, the IIAA acted as one of the three re-
gional offices of the TCA which had been assigned responsibili-
ties to direct technical assistance activities throughout the
"Outline of Point Pour Organization, Policy, and Opera-
tions," Department of State Publication
.
February 14, 1952, p. 4.
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world. The Institute at the same time was offering its long-time
successful experience to the TCA's new Hear East and African De-
velopment Service and Asia Development Service which would func-
tion similarly to the IIAA. Together these programs offered one
of the most effective substantive contributions of the United
States to the free world against Communism.
How the joint Latin American IIAA projects had cut the
ground out from under Communism was recently illustrated in Pe-
ru. 33 The Camana Valley, isolated by nature from the rest of the
country, had 8,500 inhabitants which the Communist Party had or-
ganized a few years ago, even electing a congressman. The Presi-
dent of Peru called upon the cooperative program to build and run
a rice mill in this region. It was agreed to on condition that
the program would not be involved in politics and would do only
those things necessary for agricultural development. Not only
is a rice mill now functioning with the most modern dehydrating
equipment, but Camana farmers had improved methods of sTjrsyir;/?
irrigation, plowing, cultivating, and harvesting. Today the val-
ley's inccre is five tines what it »as before t"-e service began
its constructive work. And the appreciative government reported
the Communist threat had vanished.
Recently the joint program of which the IIAA is a party had
been concentrating on spreading the organization of farm credit
facilities. Also, the program had been increasing the education-
"Point Pour in Latin America," Peruvian Times
. April 18,1952, p. 12
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al campaign in the Latin American countries in which it was co-
operating in the operation of agricultural programs.
Manifestly, this broad and deep program of technical assist-
ance fulfilled the historic Good Neighbor program, particularly
in the aspect of that policy to encourage self-help, self-reli-
ance, and self-respect. Also, the program fulfilled not only the
specific call of the President for Point Pour technical assist-
ance, but also fulfilled the President's further observation in
the Point Pour speech: "Experience shows that our commerce with
other countries expands as they progress industrially and econom-
ically "
The essence of the Point Pour philosophy, of which the IIAA
is an instrument, was perhaps best expressed by the late Dr. Hen-
ry G. Bennett, Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Admin-
istration, who recently lost his life in an airplane disaster,
when he said:
Our friends of the underdeveloped areas do not
want charity. They want to become independent, by
their own efforts, of our help and of all outside
help. They are eternally right in asking us to share
knowledge and skill — which cannot be given away
so that they may achieve self-reliance and the dig-
nity that goes with it. They represent old cultures
that long predate ours.... They would not permit us to
superimpose our culture on theirs, even if we were so
foolish as to try. There are as many paths to prog-
ress as there are nations. They want to choose their
own.-54
"Point Pour in Latin America," Peruvian Times , April 18,
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SECTIONS FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ,
JANUARY 20, 1949, INAUGURAL ADDRESS
In the coming years, our program for peace and
freedom will
emphasize four major courses of action.
First we will continue to give unfaltering support to
the
United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue
to
search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase
their
effectiveness! We believe that the United Nations will be
strengthened by the new nations which are being formed in
lands
now advancing toward self-government under democratic
principles.
Second, we will continue our programs for world economic re-
covery.
This means, first of all, that we must keep our full weight
behind the European Recovery Program. We are confident 01 tne
success of this major venture in world recovery. We believe that
our partners in this effort will achieve the status of self-sup-
porting nations once again.
In addition, we must carry out our plans for reducing the
barriers to world trade and increasing its volume. Economic re-
covery and peace itself depend on increased world trade.
Third, we will strengthen freedom-loving nations against the
dangers of aggression.
We are now working out with a number of countries a joint
agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlan-
tic area. Such an agreement would take the form of a collective
defense arrangement within the terms of the United Nations Char-
ter.
We have already established such a defense pact for the
Western Hemisphere by the treaty of Rio de Janeiro.
The primary ouroose of these agreesents is to provide un-
mistakeable proof* of* the joint determination of the free coun-
tries to resist armed attack from any quarter. Each country par-
ticipating in these arrEr^renents Eust contribute all it can to
1
"The Faith of the American People," A New Era in World Af-
fairs, (Department of State Publication), l9~49, pp. 5-8.
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the common defense.
If we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any
armed attack affecting our national security would be met with
overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur.
I hope soon to send to the Senate a treaty respecting the
North Atlantic security plan.
In addition, we will provide military advice and equipment
to free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance
of peace and security.
Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial Drogress
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.
More than half the people of the world are living in condi-
tions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are
victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stag-
nant. Their poverty is a handicap and a great threat both to them
and to more prosperous areas.
For the first time in history, humanity possesses the know-
ledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.
The United States is preeminent among nations in the develop-
ment of industrial and scientific techniques. The material re-
sources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other
peoples are limited. But our imponderable resqurces in techni-
cal knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.
I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peo-
pies the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to
help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in
cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital invest-
ment in areas needing development.
Our aims should be to help the free peoples of the world
through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing
more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lightentheir burdens. °
We invite other countries to pool their technological re-
sources in this undertaking. Their contributions will be warmly
welcomed. This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all
nations work together through the United Nations and its special-ized agencies wherever practicable. It must be a world-wide ef-fort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom.
With the cooperation of business, private capital, agricul-ture, and labor in this country, this program can greatly in-
crease the industrial activity in other nations and can raise
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substantially their standards of living.
Such new economic developments must be devised and con-
trolled to benefit the peoples of the areas in which they are es-
tablished. Guaranties to the investor must be balanced by guar-
anties in the interest of the people whose resources and whose
labor go into these developments.
The old imperialism — exploitation for foreign profit —
has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of de-
velopment based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.
All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from
a constructive program for the better use of the world's human
and natural resources. Experience shows that our commerce with
other countries expands as they progress industrially and econom-
ically.
Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And
the key to greater production is wider and more vigorous appli-
cation of modern scientific and technical knowledge.
Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help
themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying
life that is the right of all people.
Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the
peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against
their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies —
hunger, misery, and despair.
On the basis of these four major courses of action we hope
to help create the conditions that will lead eventually to per-
sonal freedom and happiness for all mankind.
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PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS
TRANSMITTING THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
JUNE 24, 1949 1
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: In order to enable the
United States, in cooperation with other countries, to assist the
peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to raise their stan-
dards of living, I recommend the enactment of legislation to
authorize an expanded program of technical assistance for such
areas, and an experimental program for encouraging the outflow of
private investment beneficial to their economic development.
These measures are the essential first steps in an undertaking
which will call upon private enterprise and voluntary organiza-
tions in the United States, as well as the Government, to take
part in a constantly growing effort to improve economic condi-
tions in the less developed regions of the world.
The grinding poverty and the lack of economic opportunity
for many millions of people in the economically underdeveloped
parts of Africa, the Near East and Par East, and certain regions
of Central and South America, constitute one of the greatest chal-
lenges of the world today. In spite of their age-old economic
and social handicaps, the peoples in these areas have, in recent
decades, been stirred and awakened. The spread of industrial
civilization, the growing understanding of modern concepts of
government, and the impact of two World Wars have changed their
lives and their outlook. They are eager to play a greater part
in the community of nations.
All these areas have a common problem. They must create a
firm economic base for the democratic aspirations of their citi-
zens. Without such an economic base, they will be unable to
meet the expectations which the modern world has aroused in their
peoples. If they are frustrated and disappointed, they may turn
to false doctrines which hold that the way of progress lies
through tyranny.
For the United States the great awakening of these peoples
holds tremendous promise. It is not only a promise that new and
stronger nations will be associated with us in the cause of hu-
man freedom; it is also a promise of new economic strength and
growth for ourselves.
"The Faith of the American People," A New Era in World Af-fairs, (Department of State Publication), 19"4S7"ppT"23=34":
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With many of the economically underdeveloped areas of the
world, we have long had ties of trade and commerce. In many in-
stances today we greatly need the products of their labor and
their resources. If the productivity and the purchasing power
of these countries are expanded, our own industry and agricul-
ture will benefit. Our experience shows that the volume of our
foreign trade is far greater with highly developed countries
than it is with countries having a low standard of living and in-
adequate industry. To increase the output and the national in-
come of the less developed regions is to increase our own eco-
nomic stability.
In addition, the development of these areas is of utmost im-
portance to our efforts to restore the economies of the free
Eurooean nations. As the economies of the underdeveloped areas
expand, they will provide needed products for Europe and will of-
fer a better market for European goods. Such expansion is an es-
sential part of the growing system of world trade which is neces-
sary for European recovery.
Furthermore, the development of these areas will strengthen
the United Nations and the fabric of world peace . The preamble
to the Charter of the United Nations states that the economic and
social advancement of all people is an essential bulwark of peace.
Under Article 56 of the Charter, we have promised to take sep-
arate action and to act jointly with other nations to promote
higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of
economic and social progress and development."
For these various reasons, assistance in the development of
the economically underdeveloped areas has become one of the ma-
jor elements of our foreign policy. In my inaugural address, I
outlined a program to help the peoples of these areas to attain
greater production as a way to prosperity and peace.
The major effort in such a program must be local in charac-
ter; it must be made by the people of the underdeveloped areas
themselves. It is essential, however, to the success of their
effort that there be help from abroad. In some cases, the peo-
ple of these areas will be unable to begin their part of this
great enterprise without initial aid from other countries.
The aid that is needed falls roughly into two categories.
The first is the technical, scientific, and managerial knowledge
necessary to economic development. This category includes not
only medical and educational knowledge, assistance, and advice in
such basic fields as sanitation, communications, road building,
and governmental service; but also, and perhaps most important,
assistance in the survey of resources and in planning for long-
range economic development.
The second category is production goods — machinery and
equipment — and financial assistance in the creation of produc-
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tive enterprises. The underdeve loped areas need capital for port
and harbor development, roads and communications, irrigation and
drainage projects, as well as for public utilities and the whole
range of extractive, processing, and manufacturing industries.
Much of the capital required can be provided by these areas them-
selves, in spite of their low standards of living. But much must
come from abroad.
The two categories of aid are closely related. Technical as-
sistance is necessary to lay the groundwork for productive in-
vestment. Investment, in turn, brings with it technical assist-
ance. In general, however, technical surveys of resources and of
the possibilities of economic development must precede substan-
tial capital investment. Furthermore, in many of the areas con-
cerned, technical assistance in improving sanitation, communica-
tions, or education is required to create conditions in which
capital investment can be fruitful.
This country, in recent years, has conducted relatively mod-
est programs of technical cooperation with other countries. In
the field of education, channels of exchange and communications
have been opened between our citizens and those of other coun-
tries. To some extent, the expert assistance of a number of Fed-
eral agencies, such as the Public Health Service and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, has been made available to other countries.
We have also participated in the activities of the United Nations,
its specialized agencies, and other international organizations
to disseminate useful techniques among nations.
Through these various activities, we have gained consider-
able experience in rendering technical assistance to other coun-
tries, what is needed now is to expand and integrate these ac-
tivities and to concentrate them, particularly on the economic
development of underdeveloped areas.
Much of the aid that is needed can be provided most effec-
tively through the United Nations. Shortly after my inaugural ad-
dress, this Government asked the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations to consider what the United Nations and the
specialized international agencies could do in this program.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations thereupon asked
the United Nations Secretariat and the Secretariats of the spe-
cialized international agencies to draw up cooperative plans for
technical assistance to underdeveloped areas. As a result, a
survey was made of technical projects suitable for these agencies
in such fields as industry, labor, agriculture, scientific re-
search with respect to natural resources, and fiscal management.
The total cost of the program submitted as a result of this sur-
vey was estimated to be about 35 million dollars for the first
year. It is expected that the United Nations and the specialized
international agencies will shortly adopt programs for carrying
out projects of the type included in this survey.
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In addition to our participation in this work of the United
Nations, much of the technical assistance required can be pro-
vided directly by the United States to countries needing it. A
careful examination of the existing information concerning the
underdeveloped countries shows particular need for technicians
and experts with United States training in plant and animal dis-
eases, malaria and typhus control, water supply and sewer systems,
metallurgy and mining, and nearly all phases of Industry.
It has already been shown that experts in these fields can
bring about tremendous improvements. For example, the health of
the people of many foreign communities has been greatly improved
by the work of United States sanitary engineers in setting up
modern water supply systems. The food supply of many areas has
been increased as the result of the advice of United' States ag-
ricultural experts in the control of animal diseases and the im-
provement of crops. These are only examples of the wide range of
benefits resulting from the careful application of modern tech-
niques to local problems. The benefits which a comprehensive
program of expert assistance will make possible can only be re-
vealed by studies and surveys undertaken as a part of the program
itself.
To inaugurate the program, I recommend a first-year appropri-
ation of not to exceed 45 million dollars. This includes 10 mil-
lion dollars already requested in the 1950 budget for activities
of this character. The sum recommended will cover both our par-
ticipation in the programs of the international agencies and the
assistance to be provided directly by the United States....
In every case, whether the operation is conducted through
the United Nations, the other international agencies, or directly
by the United States, the country receiving the benefit of the
aid will be required to bear a substantial portion of the ex-
pense.
The activities necessary to carry out our program of tech-
nical aid will be diverse in character and will have to be per-
formed by a number of different government agencies and private
instrumentalities. It will be necessary to utilize not only the
resources of international agencies and the United States Govern-
ment, but also the facilities and the experience of the private
business and nonprofit organizations that have long been active
in thi s work
.
Since a number of Federal agencies will be involved in the
program, I recommend that the administration of the program be
vested in the President, with authority to delegate to the Sec-
retary of State and to other government officers as may be appro-
priate. With such administrative flexibility, it will be pos-
sible to modify the management of the program as it expands and
to meet practical problems that will arise in its administration
in the future.
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The second category of outside aid needed by the underde-
veloped areas is the provision of capital for the creation of
productive enterprises. The International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development and the Export-Import Bank have provided
some capital for underdeveloped areas, and, as the economic
growth of these areas progresses, should be expected to provide
a great deal more. In addition, private sources of funds must
be encouraged to provide a major part of the capital required.
In view of the present troubled condition of the world —
the distortion of world trade, the shortage of dollars, and other
after-effects of the war -- the problem of substantially increas-
ing the flow of American capital abroad presents serious diffi-
culties. In all probability, novel devices will have to be em-
ployed if the investment from this country is to reach propor-
tions sufficient to carry out the objectives of our program.
All countries concerned with the program should work to-
gether to bring about conditions favorable to the flow of pri-
vate capital. To this end we are negotiating agreements with
other countries to protect the American investor from unwarranted
or discriminatory treatment under the laws of the country in
which he makes his investment.
In negotiating such treaties we do not, of course, ask priv-
ileges for American capital greater than those granted to other
investors in underdeveloped countries or greater than we our-
selves grant in this country. We believe that American enter-
prise should not waste local resources, should provide adequate
wages and working conditions for local labor, and should bear an
equitable share of the burden of local taxes. At the same time,
we believe that investors will send their capital abroad on an
increasing scale only if they are given assurance against risk of
loss through expropriation without compensations, unfair or dis-
criminatory treatment, destruction through war or rebellion, or
the inability to convert their earnings into dollars.
Although our investment treaties will be directed at miti-
gating such risks, they cannot eliminate them entirely. With the
best will in the world, a foreign country, particularly an under-
developed country, may not be able to obtain the dollar exchange
necessary for the prompt remittance of earnings on dollar capital.
Damage or loss resulting from internal and international violence
may be beyond the power of our treaty signatories to control.
Many of these conditions of instability in underdeveloped
areas which deter foreign investments are themselves a conse-
quence of the lack of economic developments which only foreign
investment can cure. Therefore, to wait until stable conditions
are assured before encouraging the outflow of capital to under-
developed areas would defer the attainment of our objectives in-
definitely. It is necessary to take vigorous action now to break
out of this vicious circle.
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Since the development of underdeveloped economic areas is of
major importance in our foreign policy, it is appropriate to use
the resources of the Government to accelerate private efforts
toward that end. I recommend, therefore, that the Export- Import
Bank be authorized to guarantee United States private capital,
invested in productive enterprises which contribute to economic
development in underdeveloped areas, against the risks peculiar
to those investments.
This guaranty activity will at the outset be largely exper-
imental. Some investments may require only a guaranty against
the danger of expropriation and other dangers as well. It is pos-
sible at this time to write a standard guaranty. The Bank will,
of course, be able to require the payment of premium rates that
will be most appropriate in the long run. Only experience can
provide answers to these questions.
The Bank has sufficient resources at the present time to be-
gin the guaranty program and to carry on its lending activities
as well without any increase in its authorized funds. If the de-
mand for guaranties should prove large and lending activities
continue on the scale expected, it will be necessary to request
the Congress at a later date to increase the authorized funds of
the Bank.
The enactment of these two legislative proposals, the first
pertaining to technical assistance and the second to the encour-
agement of foreign investment, will constitute a national en-
dorsement of a program of major importance in our efforts for
world peace and economic stability. Nevertheless, these measures
are only the first steps. We are at the beginning of a rising
curve of activity, private, governmental and international, that
will continue for many years to come. It is all the more im-
portant, therefore, that we start promptly.
In the economically underdeveloped areas of the world today
there are new creative energies. *'e look forward to the time
when these countries will be stronger and more independent than
they are now, and yet more closely bound to us and to other na-
tions by ties of friendship and commerce, and by kindred ideals.
On the other hand, unless we aid the newly awakened spirit in
these peoples to find the course of fruitful development, they
may fall under the control of those whose philosophy is hostile
to human freedom, thereby prolonging the unsettled state of the
world and postponing the achievement of permanent peace.
Before the peoples of these areas we hold out the promise of
a better future through the democratic way of life. It is vital
that we move quickly to bring the meaning of that promise home to
them in their daily lives.
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AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE1
Title IV
SEC. 401. This title may be cited as the "Act for International
Development."
SEC. 402. The Congress hereby finds as follows:
(a) The peoples of the United States and other nations
have a common interest in the freedom and in the economic and
social progress of all peoples. Such progress can further
the secure growth of democratic ways of life, the expansion
of mutually beneficial commerce, the development of interna-
tional understanding and good will, and the maintenance of
world peace.
(b) The efforts of the peoples living in economically un-
derdeveloped areas of the world, to realize their full capa-
bilities and to develop the resources of the lands in which
they live , can be furthered through the cooperative endeavor
of all nations to exchange technical knowledge and skills and
to encourage the flow of investment capital.
(c) Technical assistance and capital investment can make
maximum contribution to economic development only where there
is understanding of the mutual advantages of such assistance
and investment and where there is confidence of fair and rea-
sonable treatment and due respect for the legitimate inter-
ests of the peoples of the countries to which the assistance
is given and in which the investment is made and of the coun-
tries from which the assistance and investments are derived.
In the case of investment, this involves confidence on the
part of the people of the underdeveloped areas that invest-
ors will conserve as well as develop local resources, will
bear a fair share of local taxes and observe local laws, and
will provide adequate wages and working conditions for local
labor. It involves confidence on the part of investors,
through intergovernmental agreements or otherwise, that they
will not be deprived of their property without prompt, ade-
quate, and effective compensation; that they will be given
reasonable opportunity to remit their earnings and withdraw
their capital; that they will have reasonable freedom to man-
"Poreign Economic Assistance Act." Public Law 535. 81st
Congress, 2nd Session, 1950. '
—
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age, operate, and control their enterprises; that they will
enjoy security in the protection of their persons and prop-
erty*, including industrial and intellectual property, and
nondiscriminatory treatment in taxation and in the conduct
of their business affairs.
SEC. 403. (a) It is declared to be the policy of the United
States to aid the efforts of the peoples of economically un-
derdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve
their working and living conditions by encouraging the ex-
change of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of in-
vestment capital to countries which provide conditions under
which such technical assistance and capital can effectively
and constructively contribute to raising standards of living,
creating new sources of wealth, increasing productivity, and
expanding purchasing power.
(b) It is further declared to be the policy of the United
States that, in order to achieve the most effective utiliza-
tion of the resources of the United States, private and pub-
lic, which are or may be available for aid in the development
of economically underdeveloped areas, agencies of the United
States Government, in reviewing request of foreign governments
for aid for such ourposes, shall take into consideration (1)
whether the assistance applied for is an appropriate part of
a program reasonably designed to contribute to the balanced
and integrated development of the country or areas concerned;
(2) whether any works or facilities which may be projected are
actually needed in view of similar facilities existing in the
area and are otherwise economically sound; and (3) with re-
spect to projects for which capital is requested, whether pri-
vate capital is available either in the country or elsewhere
upon reasonable terms and in sufficient amounts to finance
such projects.
SEC. 404. (a) In order to accomplish the purposes' of this title,
the United States is authorized to participate in multilater-
al technical cooperation programs carried on by the United
Nations, the Organization of American states and their re-
lated organizations, and by other international organizations,
wherever practicable.
(b) Within the limits of appropriations made available to
carry out the purposes of this title, the President is auth-
orized to make contributions to the United Nations for tech-
nical cooperation programs carried on by it and its related
organizations which will contribute to accomplishing the pur-
poses of this title as effectively as would participation in
comparable programs on a bilateral basis. The President is
further authorized to make contributions for technical co-
operation programs carried on by the Organization of Ameri-
can States, its related organizations, and by other interna-
tional organizations.
(e) Agencies of the United States Government on request
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of international organizations are authorized, upon approval
by the President, to furnish services and such facilities as
may be necessary in connection therewith, on an advance of
funds or reimbursement basis, for such organizations' in con-
nection with their technical cooperation urograms . Amounts
received as reimbursements from such organizations shall be
credited, at the option of the appropriate agency, either to
the appropriation, fund, or account utilized in incurring the
obligation, or to an arroropriate appropriation, fund, or ac-
count currently available for the purposes for which expendi-
tures were made.
SEC. 405. The President is authorized to plan, undertake, admin-
ister, and execute bilateral technical cooperation programs
carried on by any United States Government agency and, in so
doing —
(a) To coordinate and direct existing and new technical
cooperation programs.
(b) To assist other interested governments in the formula-
tion of programs for the balanced and integrated development
of the economic resources and productive capacities of eco-
nomically underdeveloped areas.
(c) To receive, consider, and review reports of joint com-
missions set up as provided in Section 410 of this title.
(d) To make, within appropriations made available for the
purpose, advances and grants in aid of technical cooperation
programs to any person, corporation, or other body of persons,
or to any foreign government or foreign government agency.
(e) To make and perform contracts or agreements in respect
of technical cooperation programs on behalf of the United
States Government with any person, corporation, or other body
of persons however designated, whether within or without the
United States, or with any foreign government or foreign gov-
ernment agency: Provided , That with respect to contracts or
agreements which entail commitments for the expenditure of
funds appropriated pursuant to the authority of this title,
such contracts or agreements, within the limits of appropria-
tions or contract authorizations hereafter made available
may, subject to any future action of the Congress, run for
not to exceed three years in any one case.
(f) To provide for printing and binding outside the con-
tinental limits of the United States, without regard to Sec-
tion 11 of the Act of March 1, 1919 (44 U.S.C. 111).
(g) To provide for the publication of information made
available by the joint commissions referred to in Section
410, and from other sources, regarding resources, opportun-
ities for private investment capital, and the need for tech-
nical knowledge and skill in each participating country.
SEC. 406. Agreements made by the United States under the author-
ity of this title with other governments and with interna-
tional organizations shall be registered with the Secretariat
140
of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of
Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.
SEC. 407. In carrying out .the programs authorized in Section 405
of this title —
(a) The participation of private agencies and persons
shall be sought to the greatest extent practicable.
(b) Due regard shall be given, in reviewing requests for
assistance, to the possibilities of achieving satisfactory
results from such assistance as evidenced by the desire of
the country requesting it (1) to take steps' necessary to make
effective use of the assistance made available, including the
encouragement of the flow of productive local and foreign, in-
vestment capital where needed for development; and (2) to en-
deavor to facilitate the development of the colonies, posses-
sions, dependencies, and nonself-governing territories ad-
ministered by such requesting country so that such areas may
make adequate contribution to the effectiveness of the assist-
ance requested.
(c) Assistance shall be made available only where the
President determines that the country being assisted —
(1) Pays a fair share of the cost of the orogram.
(2) Provides all necessary information concerning such
program and gives the program full publicity.
(3) Seeks to the maximum extent possible full coordina-
tion and integration of technical cooperation programs
being carried on in that country.
(4) Endeavors to make effective use of the results of the
program.
(5) Cooperates with other countries participating in the
program in the mutual exchange of technical knowledge
and skills.
SEC. 408. The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the
provisions of this title.
SEC. 409. The President shall create an advisory board, herein-
after referred to as the "board," which shall advise and con-
sult with the President or such other officer as he may desig-
nate to administer the program herein authorized, with re-
spect to general or basic policy matters arising in connec-
tion with operation of the program. The board shall consist
of not more than 13 members to be appointed by the President,
one of whom, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, shall be appointed by him as chairman. The members of
the board shall be broadly representative of voluntary agen-
cies and other groups Interested in the Program, including
business, labor, agriculture, public health, and education.
All members of the board shall be citizens of the United
States; none except the chairman shall be an officer or an
employee of the United States (including any agency or in-
strumentality of the United States) who as such regularly re-
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gularly received compensation for current services. Members
of the board, other than the chairman, if he is an officer of
the United States Government, shall receive out of funds made
available for the purposes of this title a per diem allowance
of $50 for each day spent away from their homes or regular
places of business for the purpose of attendance at meetings
of the board or at conferences held upon the call of the
chairman, and in necessary travel, and while so engaged they
may be paid actual travel expenses and not to exceed $10 per
diem in lieu of subsistence and other expenses. The Presi-
dent may aDOoint such committees in special fields of activi-
ty as he may determine to be necessary or desirable to effec-
tuate the purposes of this title. The members of such com-
mittees shall receive the same compensation as that provided
for members of the board.
SEC. 410. (a) At the request of a foreign country, there may be
established a joint commission for economic development to be
composed of persons named by the President and persons to be
named by the' requesting country, and may include representa-
tives of international organizations mutually agreed upon.
(b) The duties of each such joint commission shall be mu-
tually agreed upon, and may include, among other things, ex-
amination of the following:
(1) The requesting country's requirements with respect to
technical assistance.
(2) The requesting country's resources and potentiali-
ties, including mutually advantageous opportunities
for utilization of foreign technical knowledge and
skills and investment.
(3) Policies which will remove deterrents to and otherwise
encourage the introduction, local development, and ap-
plication of technical skills and the creation and ef-
fective utilization of capital, both domestic and for-
eign; and the implementation of such policies by ap-
propriate measures on the part of the requesting coun-
try and the United States, and of other countries when
appropriate and after consultation with them.
(c) Such joint commissions shall prepare studies and re-
ports which they shall transmit to the appropriate authorities
of the United States and of the requesting countries. In such
reports the joint commissions may include recommendations as
to any specific projects which they conclude would contribute
to the economic development of the requesting countries.
(d) The costs of each joint commission shall be borne by
the United States and the requesting country in the propor-
tion that may be agreed upon between the President and that
country.
SEC. 411. All or part of United States support for and partici-
pation in any technical cooperation program carried on under
this title shall be terminated by the President —
(a) If he determines that such support and participation
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no longer contribute effectively to the purposes of this
title, are contrary to a resolution adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations that the continuance of such
technical cooperation programs in unnecessary or undesirable,
or are not consistent with the foreign policy of the United
States.
(b) If a concurrent resolution of both Houses of the Cong-
ress finds such termination is desirable.
SSC. 412. The President may exercise any power or authority con-
ferred on him by this title through the Secretary of State or
through any other officer or employee of the United States
Government.
SEC. 413. In order to carry out the purposes of this title --
(a) The President shall appoint, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, a person who, under the direction
of the President or such other officer as he may designate
pursuant to Section 412 hereof to exercise the powers con-
ferred upon him by this title, shall be responsible for plan-
ning, implementing, and managing the programs authorized in
this title. He shall be compensated at a rate fixed by the
President without regard to the Classification Act of 1949
but not in excess of 515,000 per annum.
(b) Officers, employees, agents, and attorneys may be em-
ployed for duty within the continental limits of the United
States in accordance with the provisions of the civil-service
laws and the Classification Act of 1949.
(c) Persons employed for duty outside the continental lim-
its of the United States Government assigned for such duty may
receive compensation at any of the rates provided for the For-
eign Service Reserve and Staff by the Foreign Service Act of
1946 (60 Stat. 999), as amended, may receive allowances and
benefits not in excess of those established thereunder, and
may be appointed to any class in the Foreign Service Reserve
or Staff in accordance with the provisions of such Act.
(d) Alien clerks and employees employed for the purpose
of performing functions under this title shall be employed in
accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of
1946, as amended.
(e) Officers and employees of the United States Govern-
ment may be detailed to offices or positions to which no com-
pensation is attached with any foreign government agency or
with any international organization: Provided
,
That, while
so detailed, any such person shall be considered, for the
purpose of preserving his privileges, rights, seniority, or
other benefits, an officer or employee of the United States
Government agency from which detailed and shall receive
therefrom his regular compensation, which shall be reimbursed
to such agency from funds available under this title: Pro-
vided further
, That such acceptance of office shall in no
case involve the taking of an oath of allegiance to another
government.
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(f
)
Experts and consultants or organizations thereof may
be employed as authorized by Section 15 of the Act of Aug-
ust 2, 1946 (5 U.S.C. 55a), and individuals so employed may
be compensated at a rate not in excess of $75 per diem.
(g) Such additional civilian personnel may be employed
without regard to Subsection (a) of Section 14 of the Federal
Employees Pay Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 219), as amended, as may
be necessary to carry out the policies and purposes of this
title.
SEC. 414. No citizen or resident of the United States, whether
or not now in the employ of the Government, may be employed
or assigned to duties by the Government under this Act until
such individual has been investigated by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and a report thereon has been made to the
Secretary of State: Provided , however , That any present em-
ployee of the Government, pending the report as to such em-
ployee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may be em-
ployed or assigned to duties under this Act for the period of
three months from the date of its enactment. This section
shall not apply in the case of any officer appointed by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
S3C. 415. The President shall transmit to the Congress an annual
report of operations under this title.
SEC. 416. (a) In order to carry out the provisions of this title,
there shall be made available such funds as are hereafter
authorized and appropriated from time to time for the pur-
poses of this title: Provided , however , That for the purpose
of carrying out the provisions of this title through June 30,
1951, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated a sum not
to exceed $35,000,000, including any sums appropriated to
carry on the activities of the Institute of Inter-American
Affairs, and technical cooperation programs as defined in Sec-
tion 418 there in under the United States Information and Ed-
ucational Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 6). Activities pro-
vided for under this title may be prosecuted under such ap-
propriations or under authority granted in Appropriation Acts
to enter into contracts pending enactment of such appropria-
tions. Unobligated balances of such appropriations for any
fiscal year may, when so specified in the appropriation act
concerned, be carried over to any succeeding fiscal year or
years. The President may allocate to any United States Gov-
ernment agency any part of any appropriation available for
carrying out the purposes of this title. Such funds shall be
available for obligation and expenditure for the purposes of
this title in accordance with authority granted hereunder or
under authority governing the activities of the Government
agencies to which such funds are allocated.
(b) Nothing in this title is intended nor shall it be con-
strued as an expressed or implied commitment to provide any
specific assistance, whether of funds, commodities, or serv-
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ices, to any country or countries, or to any international
organization.
SEC. 417. If any provision of this title or the application of
any provision to any circumstances or persons shall he held
invalid, the validity of the remainder of the title and the
applicability of such provision to other circumstances or per-
sons shall not he affected thereby.
SEC. 418. As used in this title --
(a) The term "technical cooperation orograns means pro-
grams for the international interchange of technical know-
ledge and skills designed to contribute to the balanced and
integrated development of the economic resources and produc-
tive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas. Such
activities may include, but need not be limited to, economic,
engineering, medical, educational, agricultural, fishery,
mineral, and fiscal surveys, demonstration, training, and
similar projects that serve the purpose of promoting the de-
velopment of economic resources and productive capacities of
underdeveloped areas. The term "technical cooperation pro-
grams" does not include such activities authorized by the
United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of
1948 (62 Stat. 6) as are not primarily related to economic
development nor activities undertaken now or hereafter pur-
suant to the International Aviation Facilities Act (62 Stat.
450), nor pursuant to the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of
1946 (60 Stat. 128), as amended, nor pursuant to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 137), as amended, nor ac-
tivities undertaken now or hereafter in the administration
of areas occupied by the United States armed forces or in
Korea by the Economic Cooperation Administration.
(b) The term "United States Government Agency" means any
department, agency, board, wholly or partly owned corpora-
tion or instrumentality, commission, or independent estab-
lishment of the United States Government.
(c) The term "international organization" means any inter-
governmental organization of which the United States is a mem-
ber.
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Since V-E Day, the implementation of the United States for-
eign policy had been largely in the field of reconstruction
rather than development. Under the reconstruction policy, lend-
lease ceased in 1945, the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed, and
Secretary of State Marshall presented his plan for a long-range
economic recovery program. Although aware of the importance of
restoring the export capacity of Western Europe, spokesmen for
the underdeveloped areas were growing impatient to translate in-
to action the promise of international cooperation to promote
social and economic development.
On January 20, 1949, President Truman in his inaugural ad-
dress laid the foundation for what was to be known as Point Pour.
He believed the United States should make available the benefits
of its store of technical knowledge in the areas needing develop-
ment. In his program, he proposed to help the governments of
underdeveloped areas do those things which would make the areas
attractive for large-scale capital investment from private
sources. The Point Pour program represented an attempt to meet
the aspirations of the underdeveloped peoples, and at the same
time an effort to meet the challenge of the Communists.
The purpose of this study is to present to the reader the
conflicting attitudes and the various interpretations in regard
to the Point Pour program. Idealists saw in the concept an op-
portunity without parallel to extend to all who want them the
standard of living and the way of life that had made the United
States envied among nations. Skeptics suspected we were being
2tricked into dissipating our resources in a task we could never
expect to complete, leaving the United States prey to a cynical
enemy who hopefully awaited our economic ruin. Between these two
extremes, students of the idea saw an opportunity to foster sta-
ble governments and contented nations while building up markets
for our own exports and sources of the raw materials we need.
Those who favored Point Four saw it as a program for improv-
ing the living standards throughout the world in countries which
had not been industrialized and had neither the education nor hy-
genic standards of the Marshall countries. They saw it as a part
of the plan of the Western European countries for development of
their dependent areas and as a measure for combating Communism.
The program would be mainly one of self-help by the people them-
selves, and it would be international in scope. The cost to the
Federal Government would be very little as most of the funds
would come from private investments. Proponents of Point Four
brought out the fact that there was little that was new in this
program, because for years technical aid and capital investment
in economically backward countries had been a part of American
commercial activities. Much dissention came over the guarantee
proposals for private investment. Opponents emphasized that
there was much danger in overestimating the force that American
guarantees would have in raising the living standards, and that
such operations could lead to "imperialism" or at least charges
to that effect. Also, guarantees might actually discourage ex-
pansion of private capital overseas. Proponents argued that
American business had the right to expect protection from their
3governments. Representative Christian A. Herter offered the so-
lution of having bi-lateral treaties to create a suitable climate
for and to safeguard the American investment without recourse to
guarantees.
In opposition to Point Pour, many Congressmen failed to
perceive the difference between Point Pour and previous economic
measures. They visualized a "world-wide WPA" that would be a
"give-away program," and that a proposal on such a financial
scale would bring about deficit spending and would threaten, if
not destroy, our national economy. According to the opposition,
the United States should consider its own underdeveloped areas
first before extending its markets and resources across the world.
The opposition also said that this program was eagerly sought by
the Soviet Union as it fitted into their blueprint for the de-
struction of the Western World. That there was danger in over-
promising against Communist advances was brought out as one of
the opposition's arguments.
The Congressmen most responsible for the passage of the Act
for International Development were Samuel Rayburn (D-Tex.), Chris-
tian A. Herter (R-Mass.), Jacob J. Javits (R-N. Y.), and John Kee
(D-W. Va.).
The main agencies through which Point Four has been imple-
mented are the Technical Cooperation Administration, with its sub-
divisions of the Near East and African Development Service and
the Asian Development Service; the Mutual Security Agency, known
as STEM; the Institute of Inter-American Affairs; and the Foreign
Service Institute. The countries included in the program are the
4American Republics; independent countries of Africa (Liberia,
Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt); the Near East (Arab States,
Iran and Israel); and South Asia countries of Afganistan, Cey-
lon, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. The approximate sum of money
spent for Point Four through the fiscal year of 1952 was
#245,500,000.
The principal sources of information were the Congressional
Record
, the State Department Bulletins and Publications , the For-
eign Policy Association Reports and Bulletins
,
the Mew York Times
,
the Brookings Studies Group publications, and various periodicals
including Newsweek, Time
,
and the Annals of American Academy of
Political and Social Science.
